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Abstract
        In this paper we explore the substitutability of formal and informal property
rights.  We analyze new survey data from Ecuador, where households have both
formal and informal claims to urban residential property.  The latter come from a
variety of sources, including the activity of a local boss, or organizer.  We first develop
a theory of the ability to sell or rent land in which a distinction is drawn between
transferable property rights (e.g., title) and non-transferable claims (e.g., length of
residence).  We use this theory of transactions to show that the increase in price that
follows the granting of title may be an overestimate of the households’ utility gain.  In
our empirical work we find that the unconditional effect of granting title is to raise
properties’ value by 23.5%. However, we also find that informal property rights can
substitute effectively for formal property rights, so the marginal effect of titling on the
ability to transact and on prices can vary widely among communities and among
households within a community. For example, the value of property owned by a newly
established household with no adult males can increase by 46% with the acquisition of
title. These findings suggest that titling programs should be targeted at young
disorganized communities if they are to have much effect.
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1 I. Introduction
Strong property rights occupy a prominent position in the list of prerequisites
for market economies to function well.  The strength of a country’s property rights is
typically associated with the formal institutions that maintain these rights, such as title
registries and judicial systems.  The importance of these formal institutions in
influencing economic behaviour and welfare depends, though, on the availability of
informal sources of property rights.  Even in societies characterized by a high degree
of formalization, ownership rights can be created and enforced by other means.  These
might include community information and ability to sanction, or the activity of private
protection agents stepping in where state enforcement is weak, as is currently observed
in many East European countries.1   In this paper, we model and assess empirically the
relative effects of formal and informal rights and their interactions with each other.
We find that informal sources of property rights confer many of the same advantages
as formal rights.  Thus, as a policy matter, it is not possible to assess the importance of
formalizing rights without scrutinizing the other sources of rights available to owners.
One approach to quantifying the utility conferred by a particular type of
ownership right is to compare the sale value of a property with that right to that of a
similar property which differs from the first only in that it does not have the same
property right associated with it (via hedonic price regressions).  For example, this
strategy has been used to compare the value of titled versus untitled land.  We develop
a model of property transactions to show that the sale value of a property is a function
not only of the utility conferred by ownership of the property, but also the confidence
of buyers that a commitment to sell will be honored.  Where there is transactions
uncertainty, market prices will understate the utility derived from property ownership.
                                                          
1 There is a wide and varied literature on the role of social groups in upholding
ownership rights and enforcing contracts, in contexts as diverse as kinship groups in
Africa to ranchers on the American plains (see, for example, Ellickson, 1991, on the
latter). Gambetta (1993) gives a fascinating account of the role of the Mafia as a
private source of  property rights in Sicily.
2Formalizing rights may reduce this uncertainty, thereby lessening the degree to which
prices understate utility. Thus, in environments characterized by such uncertainty, this
effect must also be considered when interpreting a price change as a measure of the
welfare gain associated with formal property rights.
Our investigation centers on land ownership in low-income communities in
Guayaquil, Ecuador. There, as in many cities in the developing world, a significant
part of the population lives on land that it does not formally own.   Despite this, many
of these untitled squatters consider themselves to be the ‘owners’ of the land that they
occupy and, in fact, have frequently paid money to obtain this right.  Often large
numbers of people arrive overnight to squat on a piece of land in so-called ‘land
invasions’, quickly building temporary shelters and relying on the weight of their
numbers to help them avoid eviction.  These invasions are frequently coordinated by
‘dirigentes’ or ‘organizers’ and it is to such a person that participants may make
payments in order to acquire ‘ownership’ of a plot. 2  With an overlay of community,
organizer, and formally supported ownership rights, these communities are a
particularly interesting setting in which to consider the interaction of multiple sources
of property rights.
There is also a policy rationale for focusing on this setting, given that in recent
years titling programs have been proposed, and implemented, as development projects.
Since 1992 the Municipality of Guayaquil has itself run a titling program to formalize
the rights of untitled squatters.  There are numerous benefits expected from such a
program. Granting households title could increase their tenure security.  This is valued
by households because it helps them avoid the potential disruption associated with
sudden eviction.  In addition, long term tenure security allows a household to capture
the benefit of long term durable investments in housing quality and to contribute to the
                                                          
2 As noted below, organizers are typically politicians.  Thus the requisite ‘payment’ may
be partly or entirely political in nature, for example, a squatter may be expected to attend
rallies in support of the organizer or his party.
3creation and maintenance of community assets.  By clarifying ownership rights and
making those rights transferable, titling is expected to lower transactions costs in the
land market.  This is clearly useful to households with an interest in moving to another
location--but is also important to new arrivals in the city who are themselves searching
for low cost housing.  Even for households who never intend to sell, the ability to
alienate property may permit the use of land as collateral for formal loans.  Thus,
granting title not only would increase the incentive of households to improve their
properties and their communities, but also, by lowering the cost of credit, their ability
to do so.  In addition, when urban land is titled, utility providers are able to charge for
services, and municipal governments can use property taxes to finance infrastructure
investments.3  The cost of such municipal services is often far lower than the cost of
the alternatives available to poor households (World Bank, 1994).
In this paper we analyze newly collected survey data which include an array of
quantitative information about household and community characteristics related to
both formal and informal ownership rights to land.  We investigate both households’
security of tenure and the operation of property  markets.  Our model of property
transactions demonstrates that it is important to recognize that ownership claims differ
in an important sense: some are transferable and others are not.  The key, and counter-
intuitive, result of the theoretical model is that stronger informal rights, to the extent
that they are non-transferable, may make it more difficult to engage in property
transactions.  Because a household cannot convey these rights to a buyer, and further,
cannot credibly commit to forsaking the use of these rights to reassert its ownership
                                                          
3 A well-known Peruvian advocate of property rights, Hernando de Soto, has pursued the
idea that, given the expanded markets that the titling of squatter neighborhoods would
create for banks and utility companies, it might be possible to enlist their aid in
underwriting some of the costs of titling (Economist, December 9, 1995).  In Lima,
KARPA S.A., a construction company which sells housing supplies on credit to titled
households in invaded areas, has donated material, computers and salaries to government
agencies involved in the titling and registration of squatter communities in order to
accelerate the process for would-be customers  (Lastarria-Cornhiel and Barnes, 1995).
4after a ‘sale’, potential buyers face greater contract uncertainty when transacting with
households that have strong non-transferable rights.   The same feature has the
converse effect in the rental market.  There, having strong non-transferable rights
improves a household’s ability to transact by lowering the likelihood that difficulties
are encountered in trying to reclaim property from a renter after the period of the rental
contract.
We provide evidence that transaction uncertainty does, in fact, impede the
operation of the land market, and thus that this theoretical distinction is important in
understanding the role of formal property rights.  The empirical evidence is based on
the idea that some household characteristics, such as wealth, education, and
demographic structure, may improve the ability of a household to use informal
mechanisms to support its ownership claims.  These household characteristics are
clearly non-transferable.   We identify households with only females and children as
being more vulnerable, in the sense of having low levels of such authority-based, non-
transferable rights, and find that non-transferable rights have the predicted, differing,
impacts on the ability to transact in the sale and rental markets.
We also estimate hedonic price equations to capture the aggregate effect of
different types of rights on welfare.  Typically, the estimation of hedonic price equations
requires dealing with both unobservable quality characteristics and the endogenous
nature of title.  With a purposefully designed survey we avoid both of these econometric
problems by estimating ‘within’ household (and property) changes in price, using
responses to questions about the value of property in hypothetical title states.
Recognizing that changes in property rights affect both utility and the level of
transactions uncertainty, our results suggest that households in these low-income
communities obtain, on average, only a moderate increase in utility from owning a
property which is titled (an upper bound improvement of 23.5%).  However, we also
find that the benefit depends importantly on other features of the environment.  For
5example, in recently settled communities without an organizer, where one would
expect informal rights to be relatively weak, title is particularly important.
(Households in communities only one year old and with no organizer gain as much as
47.3 percentage points more from title than those in communities with mean
characteristics.)  Further, we find that acquiring title has a significantly greater effect
on the utility that more vulnerable households obtain from their property.  This implies
that there may be positive distributional effects resulting from titling programs.
Together, these results suggest that a titling program should be targeted at
communities with weak systems of informal rights, or at households with limited
access to them, if it is to significantly improve welfare.
Thus, the results shed light on the type of communities and households which
would benefit most from a policy of formalizing rights. However, even when positive,
such that a titling programs would appear, on the face of it, an attractive option, it must
be recognized that obtaining title is not costless to households, nor is establishing an
effective system of formal property rights. 4   We present evidence about the time taken
to obtain a title and the costs to squatter households, and find the latter to be
equivalent, on average to annual per capita consumption.  Social costs are also not
negligible.  In recent reviews of World Bank-funded titling projects the authors
emphasize the consistent underestimation by project managers of the substantial
investments in institution building, and the political will, required for the task, a fact
leading to substantial cost overruns on all projects (see, for example, Wachter and
English, 1992; Holstein, 1993, and the evaluation reports cited therein).    Thus,
policymaking requires empirical information about when the size of the benefits might
be large enough to justify efforts to accelerate titling.
                                                          
4 Observers of the African experience suggest that one cannot assume that ‘benefits’
will be positive. There, with customary rights very well entrenched, granting formal
title may have actually increased ownership and transactions uncertainty in situations
where it became unclear which of the dually operating systems of rights would prevail.
6Previous empirical studies of the role of formal property rights have typically
not taken into account the complex interaction between formal and informal systems of
rights, lacking measures which capture the variety of sources of ownership claims. 5
However,  a few studies have considered the related question of how  market
characteristics mediate the value of formal property rights, investigating whether
formal rights are less useful when market access is costly, formal credit is limited, or
there are imperfections in other input markets.  This possibility is discussed, for
example, in Feder, et. al. (1988),  Migot-Adholla, et. al. (1991), and Carter, Wiebe and
Blarel (1994).   It is formalized in Alston, Libecap and Schneider (1996) who interact
title with distance from a market in land value estimations; and  in Carter and Olinto
(1996) who allow household characteristics to influence credit constraints in a multiple
equation model of investment.  The latter emphasize that household characteristics,
notably wealth, may affect the value of title (and they estimate a positive interaction).
However, their argument centers on the influence that these characteristics have in
determining credit access--it is not through any effect on informal property rights. 6
In estimates of the effect of land rights on investment in Africa, Besley (1995)
includes, in addition to formal title, both household and plot characteristics which
might affect the degree of control over property.   However, he does not allow for
                                                          
5  Some studies have considered variation in types of formal rights.  For example, in
Thailand, the government granted formal titles and also certificates granting formal
tenure security but not the right to alienate property (Feder, et. al.,  1988, and see also
Hoy and Jimenez, 1997).
6 Classifying households which use suboptimal levels of variable inputs as credit
constrained,  López (1995) also finds that such constraints are less likely to be a
problem for households which are titled, and, in his data, for households where the
head is well-educated.  He evaluates the increase in income obtained by the increase in
the probability that optimal levels are used times the associated increase in agricultural
income.  Although he does not calculate it explicitly, title will have different effects
for households of different education levels.  But again, the interaction between the
household characteristic and title comes through the operation of the credit market
rather than through any effect on alternative sources of property rights.
7interactions between formal and informal sources of rights.  All of these studies have
focused exclusively on rural areas.
Jimenez (1984) and Fridman, Jimenez and Mayo (1988) estimate hedonic price
regressions for urban areas of the Philippines which are closest to those presented here.
In an acknowledgment of the fact that the value of title may vary with the strength of
informal rights, they interact title with the age of the dwelling to allow for the fact that
older units might be ‘de facto’ secure from eviction. Their results, like ours, support
this contention.  They do not, however, go any further to explore other features of
communities which might affect property rights.  As here, they also find that
household characteristics affect the price premium associated with of title, but their
rationale for this finding is quite different from that suggested here.  Using a model of
location choice, they show that household characteristics may be correlated with
unobservable exogenous variation in community-level risk of eviction. By contrast, in
our model, a change in household characteristics alters informal rights and therefore
changes the risk of eviction.   That is, rather than richer households choosing areas
where title is less important, title is less important by virtue of the fact that they are
rich households and therefore can assert their rights without having title.  Given that
many of our households obtained their properties in invasions, and that they tend to
have had long periods of tenure, the type of sorting implied in the locational choice
model may be less relevant in our context.  It  is, however, not possible to distinguish
between these two interpretations of the effect of household characteristics on value
based only on the results of hedonic price regressions.  For this, the more detailed look
at households’ abilities to transact in different markets presented here is important in
showing that household characteristics may, in fact, be determinants of informal rights
and thus the risk associated with property ownership.
In the following section we develop a model of land transactions.  We use the
model to investigate the theoretical links between different types of property rights in
influencing both the ability to transact in property and the market value of property.  In
8Section III we discuss the data in some detail and, in particular, the relationship
between variables in the data and types of ownership claims.  Because, to our
knowledge, this is the first survey of this sort, much of the analysis has been
exploratory in nature: there is little known about how to go about quantifying the
strength of different sources of informal rights and certainly no pre-existing sets of
well-established proxy variables.  In Sections IV to VI we investigate empirically how
formal and informal rights contribute to tenure security; to a household’s ability to sell
and rent its property; and to the market value of property.  The focus is on the effect of
title, and on the interaction of title and other mechanisms for enforcing property rights.
In Section VII we examine the costs to residents of titling, and Section VIII concludes
with a discussion of the welfare and policy implications of the survey results.
II.  A Model of Property Transactions
In this section we develop a model of property transactions.  We first present
the model under the assumption that each household has at most one property and
expects to engage in a single property transaction.   We model the utility that
households derive from property and then the uncertainty involved in property
transfers, both as functions of the strength, and source, of ownership claims.  Then,
using the model, we determine the probability that a given household would be able to
sell to a random potential buyer and investigate how this probability changes with
improvements in property rights.  We then discuss how the results would differ for a
rental market.  Next we consider how improvements in formal property rights might
change the price at which transactions occur.  In the final subsection we allow for the
fact that households may have occasion to want to sell and rent other properties or
goods.   Then, a household’s behaviour during one transaction may affect its ability to
transact elsewhere as well informed buyers respond  to past actions.   Assuming that
households are aware of the spillover across markets, they will adjust their behaviour
in the market for the first property accordingly.  We show that this extension re-
9enforces the comparative static results found in the one property, one transaction,
model. Most of the calculations have been relegated to a technical appendix.
The Model
Consider a (single) property-owning household.  In order for the household to
sell its property, it must be able to find an acceptable buyer.  We assume that there is a
flow of potential buyers into the household's community and consider the probability
that a transaction will be possible between the household and any random potential
buyer.  A transaction will be deemed possible if and only if the minimum price that the
household would accept from the buyer, P, is less than the maximum price that the
buyer would be willing to offer, P .
Let Uh be the discounted expected stream of utility that household h derives
from a given property.  Uh is defined in monetary units and is assumed to be separable
from income and other goods.  The level of expected utility will depend upon the
qualities, Q, of the individual property, and of the community in which it is situated.
Greater ownership security will also increase the utility derived from property: it
lowers the likelihood that the household will be faced with a boundary dispute or
eviction; it widens the potential sale and rental market; and it may improve the
household's ability to use the property as a collateral asset.  Let Sh be the probability
that a household is able to maintain its ownership claims against the government,
neighbors, and family.
This security of ownership, Sh, depends, in turn, on a number of factors.  One is
the clarity of the boundaries of the property.  It is more difficult to assert ownership
claims when there is a lack of agreement about what constitutes ‘the property’.
Security of ownership also depends on the extent to which a household can, at a given
cost, successfully claim to be the owner of the property when confronted with others
10
who would like to make the same claim. 7  This may be a function of various household
characteristics, the support it receives from an organizer and its formal rights to the
property. Although all of these sources of ownership claims, C, contribute to security,
they differ in an important sense.  Some of them are transferable and others are not.
For example, if a household is able to assert its authority because it is headed by a
wealthy, well-educated male, or because it has been resident on the property for many
years, its security of ownership may be strong.  The household would not, however, be
able to convey these ownership advantages to a buyer of its property.   Further, not
only can a household not give these advantages to a buyer, it can also cannot commit
to forsaking the use of its advantages to reassert its rights over the property after a
‘sale’.   The fear of a previous occupant reasserting a claim might be particularly
worrisome to a household considering the purchase of an untitled property if a titling
program is actively underway in the community, since these efforts may lead to the
previous occupants’ claims being given an official status, and quickly.  At the other
extreme lie claims derived from having a formal property title, which are relatively
easy to transfer credibly.  Rights derived from an organizer lie somewhere in between.
If the organizer does not support a transfer then they are non-transferable claims,
which we shall denote CN, while if he agrees to a transfer then these rights are, like
title, transferable, CT.
We model the expected level of security as a function of the strength of both
types of ownership claims,
Sh = S( Ch
N , CT), (1)
                                                          
7 Formal and informal sources of claims will contribute to security only if they are both
available and cost effective.  For example, if courts are slow or costly then a titled
household may not make use of formal enforcement in a dispute even if it is eligible.
The importance of this consideration is suggested by the fact that even in our formally
settled and titled communities at least 15% of respondents named the mediation of a
community leader as the primary mode of dispute resolution.  Of course, a title deed
may contribute to informal rights if makes community recognition more likely, even if
the cost of formal enforcement is prohibitive.
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and expected utility as:
Uh  =  U( Sh( Ch
N , CT ), eh ; Q)  = n( Ch
N , CT; Q) eh,  where (2)
eh captures any unobservable factors which contribute to the utility that household h
derives from the property, and is assumed to have a proportionate effect.
Assumptions Set 1: 
¶ n
¶
ln
CT
   and  
¶ n
¶
ln
Ch
N  > 0          and  
¶ n
¶ ¶
2 ln
C CT h
N  < 0.
The negative cross-partial expresses the substitutability of transferable and non-
transferable claims in enhancing security of tenure, and therefore the utility derived
from property.  To simplify notation in the following discussion we will suppress Q.
The ability of a household to sell its property, and the price that it will be
offered by another household and will find acceptable, depend on the utility that each
party would derive from the property.  If property rights were perfect, this utility would
depend only on attributes of the property - location, size, amenities, and so on.  With
imperfect property rights, we consider two additional factors that enter a household’s
valuation of a property.  First, there is the probability that it can maintain ownership
against claims made by the government, neighbors, and family, Sh.   Second, and more
central to our work, is the probability that the purchasing household is able to maintain
ownership if the selling household tries to take back the property after a ‘sale’.  Denote
this probability by q.   In a one property, one transaction, world, a selling household
will, with probability one, try to reassert its claims (a feature which goes away once we
allow for reputational concerns below).  The probability that a household purchasing a
property will be able to maintain ownership against possible competing claims coming
from both the seller, and the government or others in the community, is then  qSh.
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In the following discussion we assume that full payment is made by a buyer at
the time of sale in order to focus attention on the buyer's uncertainty about whether the
seller will be successfully in his attempt to reclaim the property after the transaction.
Success will be determined in part by the types of observable claims that each party
can bring to bear on the property, both transferable and non-transferable.  It will also
depend on unobservable factors which affect the seller's ability to reclaim property.
Let RS be an indicator, assumed to be uniformly distributed between zero and one, of a
selling household's (unobservable) reliability in making transactions. 8  Define qSB as
the probability that a transfer of property between seller S and buyer B will be honored.
Let qSB be the lowest level that qSB can take on, given the observed characteristics of
the buyer and seller.   That is, qSB =qSB when RS = 0. qSB is modeled as follows:
qSB = RS(1 - qSB) + qSB (3)
Thus q Î [q, 1]  and is uniformly distributed over the interval. (Subscripts have been
suppressed for convenience.)  The distance between q and 1 indicates the amount of
uncertainty in the mind of the buyer about the ability of the seller to reclaim a
transferred property. q  is a function of the observable ownership claims of both
parties:
q  =  q( CS
N , CB
N , CT),   with q  Î [0, 1].
Assumptions Set 2:
¶q
¶CT
 and 
¶q
¶CB
N > 0,   
¶q
¶CS
N  < 0    and
¶ q
¶ ¶
2
C CT S
N > 0.
                                                          
8 There might be a similar unobservable factor affecting the buyer’s ability to hold on
to a purchased property.  We assume that unobservable variation across buyers is
relatively small and treat it as zero for simplicity.   This seems appropriate, as sellers
are far more likely to have hidden information about the history of the property and the
community which is of relevance to determining ownership claims.
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Thus, for example, if the presence of an organizer gives the seller less scope to renege
on a deal, then the organizer’s presence implies a higher value for q.  When q = 1, a
property transaction will be honored with certainty.
With this in hand, we now consider the minimum price that would be
acceptable to a selling household and then the maximum price that would be offered
by a potential buying household.  These bounds are used to determine the probability
that two households are able to transact.
A property-owning household will be willing to sell its property if and only if
the price paid, P, plus the household's expected utility from reclaiming the property,
(1-q)US, is at least as high as the utility it receives from retaining the property:
(1 - q)US + P  ³  US . (4)
It follows that the minimum sale price which would be acceptable to the seller is P =
qUS.   It is important to notice here that the reason that the seller will accept a price
less than US is that, in expectation, what he is selling is, in effect, less than the whole
property.
A (risk neutral) household that is considering buying the property will only
make the purchase if the utility it derives from the property, UB, times its expectation
of being able to keep it, E[q], is greater than the price.  Thus, the potential buyer will
be willing to purchase the property if and only if:
E[q]UB - P  ³  0. (5)
This defines the maximum price that a potential buyer would be willing to pay as P  =
E[q]UB.
14
We consider two types of potential buyers.  The first type, which we shall call
friends and family (F), are households who know the unobservable reliability, RS, of
the seller and consequently q.  The second type of potential buyers are outsiders ( O)
who do not know the unobservable reliability of the seller household and thus do not
know q.  These buyers must form an expectation of q based on the observable
characteristics of the seller (see the Appendix for a derivation of this expectation).
Given our assumption that a sale is possible whenever P £ P , we can write the
condition for a transaction to occur between a seller and a potential buyer as the
following condition on the size of UB relative to US:
UB  ³ g iUS, i = F, O. (6)
where the superscripts F and O represent friends and family and outside buyers,
respectively. gF = 1 and gO(RS, q) ³ 1.  (See the Appendix for the formula for gO.)   g
indexes the inefficiency of property transactions due to imperfect information.  When
the buyer is a friend or family, an exchange will occur whenever UB  ³ US, that is,
wherever it is efficient.9   This condition highlights the fact that, in transactions
between informed parties, uncertainty about the reliability of the transaction does not
enter the determination of whether it will occur.  The reason is that any uncertainty can
be accommodated, to the buyer's and seller's mutual satisfaction, by adjusting the
price.  The size of gO is decreasing in the amount of uncertainty and, as q ® 1, gO  ®
gF .  This result highlights one of the advantages of being able to commit credibly to
                                                          
9 Transactions costs would increase the minimum distance between US and UB required
for a sale, adding to g such that gi >1, all i.  As a result, with transactions costs not all
efficient trades would occur even among friends and family.  One might expect
transactions costs to be higher with less secure rights, as more effort would have to be
put into information gathering in advance of a sale, and in resolving disputes
afterwards (see Johnson, 1972).  If so, our results would tend to be strengthened by the
inclusion of transactions costs in the analysis.
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transactions: selling to strangers becomes as easy as selling to friends and family,
which increases the population of buyers available to a household.
The Ability to Transact
We can now write the probability q that a household with reliability RS and
ownership claims CT and CS
N  will be able to transact with a randomly arriving
potential buyer having characteristics CB
N .  For expositional simplicity in the
derivation of gO, we assume in the Appendix that eS = 1, all S.  Maintaining this
assumption, inserting the definition of expected utility in (2) into condition (6), and
taking logs of both sides:
q  =  1 - F[lnn( CS
N , CT) - lnn( CB
N , CT) + lngi], (7)
where F[] is the cumulative density function of lneB.  The probability of being able to
transact is decreasing in the utility that the seller obtains from owning the property and
in the index of transactions uncertainty, g.  It is increasing in the observable utility, n,
that would be obtained by the buyer if he were to own the property.
In the Appendix we derive the comparative statics of changes in property rights
on the transaction probability q.  We do this for both purchases and rentals.  Whereas
the concern in the purchase market is over the buyer’s ability to retain the property, the
corresponding concern in the rental market is over the owner’s ability to reclaim the
property at the end of the rental period.
The effects of changes in property rights can be summarized as follows:  An
increase in the property rights of the seller, if the source is stronger non-transferable
claims, CS
N , has a negative effect on the probability of being able to sell a property,
particularly to outsiders!  This counter-intuitive result is due to the combined effect of
16
CS
N on the seller’s own valuation of the property and his ability to reclaim the property.
Stronger seller rights enhance the transfer uncertainty faced by the buyer.  By the
definition of non-transferable rights, CS
N will not have corresponding impacts on the
buyer’s utility, or ability to retain the property.   The key difference with a rental
market is that, in a rental market, stronger seller rights improve the chance the contract
between the parties is honored, reducing transfer uncertainty.  Thus, while an increase
in CS
N  has a negative effect on the ability to rent when the recipients are friends and
family, the effect is ambiguous when renting to outsiders.  If transfer uncertainty is a
significant feature of the environment, stronger non-transferable rights may even have
a positive effect on the ability to rent to them.
When a household has strong non-transferable rights, an increase in
transferable claims, CT, always makes it easier to transact, in either the sale or rental
market.  Although for weak CN households the effect of an increase in CT is
theoretically ambiguous, it will be positive if transfer uncertainty is important -
particularly increasing the ability of such households to transact in the rental market.
Transaction Prices
We use the same model to explore the effects of formal and informal ownership
claims on expected transactions prices.  In this analysis we look at the changes in two
prices for any given transaction - P , the highest price that the buyer is willing to pay
and P, the lowest price that the seller would accept.  We are agnostic about where in
the interval P Î [P, P ] the transaction price will lie.
In the Appendix we show that P will unambiguously increase with CT , since
both US and q, and thus q,  increase with more formal property rights.  When we
consider P , we also find an unambiguous increase with CT , but only when the buyer is
an F.  For an outside buyer, an ambiguity is introduced because an increase in CT may
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worsen the asymmetric information problem.
As was true with the ability to transact, the magnitude of the effect of formal
rights on price depends on the seller’s non-transferable ownership claims. 10  For the
lower-bound price, authoritative households will see a greater price increase with
formal rights if transfer uncertainty dominates, and less authoritative households will
see a greater price increase with formal rights if security concerns dominate.  For the
upper-bound price, authoritative households get a relatively greater increase from
formal rights when buyers are friends or family members and, it appears, will often
also benefit more when they face outside buyers.
Multiple Transactions
We now relax the assumption that households expect to engage in, at most, one
property transaction.  For simplicity, assume that each household S has, in addition to
its first property, one other property (or durable good) which it may wish to sell.
Ownership of this second property gives it a discounted stream of utility US2 (all
variables pertaining to the second property will be subscripted by ‘ 2’)  The same
security considerations which apply to sales of the original property also apply to sales
of this second property.
We assume that friends and family members are  perfectly informed of sellers’
actions and that, if a household tries to take a property back from the buyer after a sale,
it is punished by being blocked from engaging in further property transactions with
friends and family.  This is regardless of whether it is ultimately successful in its
efforts to reclaim the first property. 11  Because transactions in the market for the
                                                          
10  We do not analyze the direct effect of changed in non-transferable claims as it is of
less policy interest and is not estimated empirically.
11  We assume that this information is known only to friends and family, but clearly
information about attempts to reclaim could be more widespread in the community,
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original property now have implications for the sale of other goods, it may no longer
be optimal for every seller to attempt to reclaim its first property.  If it tries to reclaim
and is successful it gains the original property, but this behaviour now has a cost: the
household is not able to sell other pieces of property to friends and family members. 12
If the property market is such that at least some of the surplus generated by an
exchange is allowed to stay with the seller, then being closed out of these markets may
entail giving up gains from trade.  We examine the tradeoff when it is most acute --
when all potential buyers are friends or family so that an attempt to reclaim closes off
all possibility of future trade.  To the extent that there is a pool of uninformed outside
buyers available, the incentive to maintain good behaviour would be correspondingly
diminished.
We consider a sellers’ market, where transactions occur at price P .  When a
household tries to reclaim its first property, it receives the payment from the buyer, P .
It also obtains utility from owning the first property if it is successful in reclaiming it,
which occurs with probability (1-q).  Finally, since by this behaviour it is unable to sell
its second piece of property,  it obtains utility US2 from continuing to own it.  Thus, the
household’s expected total returns are,
P + (1-q)US + US2.  (8)
If the household does not try to reclaim its first property, its expected returns are
                                                                                                                                                                            
making it of greater importance to the seller to behave honestly.
12  The equilibrium described is not subgame perfect, as some F members may wish to
transact with a seller who has attempted to reclaim.  Punishment is supportable in an
infinite repeated game which includes other interactions among the parties.  The exact
punishment is not critical to our results, just that there is one and that it increases in the
potential gains from trade in property.
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P  + E[ max{US, P2 + (1-q) US2}]. (9)
The household gives up the first property for the payment P , but now may gain some
surplus from a sale of the second.  (Here, with only two goods, the household has no
reason to refrain from trying to reclaim after the second transaction.)
The household will try to reclaim its first property if and only if its expected
returns from doing so, Equation (8) are greater than it returns from refraining, Equation
(9), or whenever,
(1-q)US   >  
-¥
¥
ò  q n e e{ } (ln )
D
B B S BU dF
¥
ò -2 2 2 2  dH(C BN ). (10)
(See the Appendix for details.)  The LHS of (10) measures the expected gain to trying
to regain the first property, while the RHS measures the expected gains from trade of
the second good available if the household  preserves its reputation for reliability.
This inequality may or may not hold.  Thus, an important implication of the
extension to multiple goods is that it is no longer necessarily optimal for all
households to try to reclaim their property after a sale.  In fact, it may be a rare
occurrence.  This would be particularly true if households have many goods, providing
opportunities for gains from trade.  The costs of a poor reputation would also be
particularly severe if there was a high probability of US2 becoming small, for example,
because of the household moving to another location and being unable to take its
property along.
Whether the inequality in (10) holds will depend, like q, on the ownership
claims of the seller.  Let l( CS
N , CT) denote the probability that the inequality holds,
making an attempt to reclaim the optimal strategy.  Then the probability that a selling
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household both tries, l, and is successful, (1-q), in reclaiming its first property after a
sale is l(1-q).
Derivations of transactions probabilities and prices in this multi-good case
follow those in the simple, one property, model, with q  replaced by [(1-l) + lq].13  It
follows that, if the effect of ownership claims on l has a sign opposite to that of the
effect of ownership claims on q, all of the results for the single property model go
through and are simply accentuated by the introduction of reputation effects.  In the
Appendix we discuss the derivatives of l in detail, and their interpretation.  Here we
simply note the results:
We find that 
¶l
¶CS
N   >  0,  which is the opposite sign to 
¶q
¶CS
N £  0.
We find that
¶l
¶CT
 
>
<
 0,  but  
¶l
¶CT
 < 0,  which is again opposite in sign to 
¶q
¶CT
³  0, in
situations where concern about tenure security in the absence of formal rights is low.
This seems to most closely correspond to the empirical results presented below.
We find that 
¶l
¶ ¶C CT S
N   <  0, which again is opposite in sign to 
¶q
¶ ¶C CT S
N  ³  0.
Based on these findings, we can conclude the following.  When households
have an interest in selling multiple goods, they have a reason to be concerned about
how buyers might respond to their actions.  As a result, not all households will find it
optimal to try to take back property after it has been sold, even if they stand some
                                                          
13  It is perhaps worth noting that, although its level does not effect the decision
whether to try to reclaim,  P  increases in value relative to the one property case.
Buyers become more confident of being able to keep purchased property because they
know that sellers have reason to care about their reputations.
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chance of actually being successful if they were to try.  Different types of ownership
claims affect the likelihood that an attempt to reclaim will be made.  Changes which
lower the likelihood of success (increasing q) tend to lower the probability that a
household will try (decreasing l).  Specifically, when considering the effects of non-
transferable claims, CS
N , introducing reputational concerns unambiguously re-
reinforces the conclusions made in the single property model, both regarding the direct
effects of CS
N  and their interactions with transferable rights.  When considering the
effects of transferable claims, CT, it is not possible to say whether the single property
model results will be enhanced or offset without further restrictions, but they are likely
to be enhanced in the empirically relevant case.
III. The Data:  Measures of Property Rights
In this section we describe the household and community surveys fielded in
Guayaquil and present some descriptive statistics.  We then discuss various measures
of rights, bearing in mind that the strength of property rights has several distinct
aspects: the clarity of the boundary definitions (what is “the property”?); clarity
regarding who has ownership claims to the property, CT and CS
N  together; and, finally,
the extent to which the ownership claims may be transferred to others, CT.
The Sample and Survey
The data analyzed in this paper derive from household and community surveys
designed specifically to address the property rights issues described in the introduction.
One section of the household survey is devoted to questions regarding tenure security,
the ability to make property transactions, and property values; another section gathers
detailed information about characteristics of properties and communities; other
sections concern households' investments in their own properties and in their
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communities; and a final section asks for detailed information on credit and associated
collateral requirements.  In addition to these purposefully designed sections, there are
several parts of the household survey closely adapted from the 1995 Ecuadorian LSMS
(Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida, ECV) which provide information on household
demographics, wage and home business income, household consumption and assets.
Each household sampled was asked to designate a person in the community
whom they viewed as particularly knowledgeable about the community and, on the
basis of this information, a short questionnaire was also administered to a community
representative.  This community survey gathered information about the origins of each
community (such as whether it was originally settled by an invasion and whether an
organizer was involved); as well as further details about current community
characteristics.14
Twenty communities were chosen as a stratified random sample from 43 low-
and middle-income communities in the city of Guayaquil.  The monthly per-capita
consumption in the population of the city as a whole was $143 in 1995 compared to
$75 among our sampled households for 1996 (figures in 1996 U.S. dollars, population
statistic based on ECV, 1995).  The sample was stratified with respect to both
community age and the percentage of community properties with formal title in order
to ensure that it would encompass areas with property rights taking a variety of forms.
Table 1 indicates that, among sample households where title status is known, 45
percent were untitled at the time of the survey.  The mean age of our communities is
23 years, where age is measured from the time of first settlement.  These are
comparable to the (unweighted) average of 53 percent of properties untitled in the
population of low and middle-income communities and an average community age of
                                                          
14 The communities are large: the median size is 2,750 households. Interestingly, the
question of what constitutes a ‘community’ and thus how to define boundaries did not
appear problematic to anyone we spoke to in Ecuador.  Most of the communities have
names and are recognized by those names.
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21 years. 15
Within each community, twenty households were selected at random to receive
the household survey.  If a chosen household turned out to be renting, an attempt was
made to interview the property owner (usually unsuccessfully).  The survey was
fielded in July-August of 1996.  In all, information was obtained for 400 households
comprising 1,921 individuals.
Sample Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents a breakdown of the sampled households by type and by title
status.  Only 22 of the households surveyed purchased their properties, with title, at the
time that they first occupied the land (‘purchasers’).  Far more commonly, lower-
income households begin their occupancy, whether on  public or private land, as
squatters without title.  This was the case for 255, or 92 percent, of our sampled
property owners.   Over time they may proceed to obtain title.  Almost half of the
squatters in our sample were titled at the time of the survey. 16   It is important to note
that our designation of a squatter household as ‘owning’ a property does not imply that
it holds title--it simply reflects the respondents’ claim to be the owner.  Similarly, our
designation of a household as a squatter household does not imply that its property is
currently untitled.
In Table 1 we see that 116, or 82 percent, of untitled owners were in the process
                                                          
15 We thank Ab. Jose Javier Varas Calvo and the M.I. Municipalidad de Guayaquil for
providing this information on age and title status for the population of low- and middle-
income communities in the city and Peter Lanjouw, World Bank, for providing the
population income figure.
16 In our empirical work we do not distinguish between titled properties which are
registered and those which are not, a distinction which has been found significant
elsewhere.  Among our sampled households with title, only a few have failed to
register their property titles.
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of trying to obtain title at the time of the survey.  (This number may sound high, but
since no minimum action was specified, ‘trying’ need not entail very active efforts.)
All but two of these 116 households gave as the primary or secondary reason for their
efforts the positive effect that title would have on their security of tenure. 17 This is
somewhat surprising given that, as we shall see below in Section IV, most of these
untitled households also stated that they viewed the likelihood of receiving an eviction
notice in the coming year as very low.  Together these responses suggest that, while
untitled owners may not feel immediately threatened by government actions, lack of
title makes them less confident of their longer term safety from the government or
from losing their properties through informal pressure.
The role of title in enhancing ownership claims is also suggested in Table 1 by
the fact that the occupancy of a property by someone other than the owner is nearly
twice as likely among titled properties as among untitled properties:  35 and 19
percent, respectively (where title status is known).  If the physical presence of the
owner is an important alternative to title in ensuring ownership rights, then this is
precisely what one would expect.  Breaking down the non-owners into those who pay
rent and those who do not, with the latter presumably more likely to be relatives or
friends of the owner, one finds that only 24 percent of those paying rent occupy
untitled properties, while 37.5 percent of those not paying rent are occupying untitled
properties.18  Although this difference is not statistically significant with the small
sample size (standard errors of 6.0 and 6.5 percentage points, respectively) it
nevertheless suggests that, not only are property owners without title reluctant to be
absent from their properties, if they are to be absent, they would prefer to ‘lend’ their
                                                          
17  This was an open question, to which the most common  responses were: to increase
security; prolonging stay on property; to avoid being forcibly removed; so land not
taken by the municipality.
18 The fact that those not paying rent tend to be more informed about whether the
household has a title or not supports the idea that they have a closer relationship with the
owner.
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properties to relatives and friends rather than to rent them to strangers.  This is
consistent with two of our results in Section II: in the presence of  transfer uncertainty
households are more able to rent to friends and family than to outsiders, and the titling
of property broadens the rental market.
Only eight households explicitly mentioned wanting a title for collateral
purposes, although an additional six households stated an interest in having a formal
document of ownership, quite possibly for the purpose of mortgaging the property.
Only three households mentioned trying to obtain title for the purpose of selling their
properties.  This is consistent with a long expected residence reported by the sampled
households (see below, Table 3).
Twenty-three of the untitled owners not attempting to obtain a title to their
properties gave a reason for their lack of action.  Of these, fourteen stated that they
were either uninterested, that they did not have sufficient time or money, or, typically,
both.  Two additional households stated that they were not trying because the
municipality was not actively encouraging titling in their community.  Since having a
survey done by the municipality is one step in the titling process, having to initiate this
process themselves raises residents’ titling costs.  It was illegal for three of the
households to obtain title, in two cases because they owned other properties which
disqualified them from further purchases of invaded land.  Interestingly, two of the 23
respondent households stated that their reason for not seeking title was a problem with
multiple claimants (family), and another two expressed a reluctance to seek title
because of concerns about the response of the organizer. 19  The latter indicates that
rights associated with having a community boss may sometimes be non-transferable,
as discussed in Section II.  Since some owners with disputed claims or potentially
                                                          
19 One of the main difficulties encountered by the municipality in its efforts to title is
the fact that it is not in the political interest of the ‘leaders’ to allow their squatters to
obtain title (interview Ab. Jose Javier Varas Calvo, emphasis ours).
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displeased bosses have no doubt gone ahead with trying to get title, these numbers are
likely to understate the prevalence of such situations.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each of the twenty communities,
drawn primarily from the community questionnaire.  The first column indicates the
number of years since each community was first settled ( age).  The oldest was settled
in 1944, the youngest in 1992.  This is followed by four columns which describe
features of its original settlement: whether the land was invaded; and if so, whether an
outside organizer was involved; whether there was resistance to the invasion and
whether it occurred on privately owned land.  Sixteen of our communities started as
invasions and about one-half had an organizer.  In eight of the nine organized
invasions, the organizer was a politician.  About half of the invasions were met with
resistance and about half were on private property.  However, there is surprisingly little
relationship between these features: some private owners did not resist the invasion of
their land, the city sometimes did, and organizers seem to have been equally active in
invasions of private and public properties.
We asked each squatter household whether, when they obtained their property,
they made any payments to a community leader, payments which were not for the
property itself.  If the household responded positively, then they are designated as
having a paid boss.  With only a few exceptions these were one time payments.  The
column headed percent paid boss then indicates the percentage of the sampled squatter
households in each community which paid a boss. 20  This measure of the presence of a
community authority differs from the dummy variable for the presence of an organizer
in column three in several ways, and one can see in the table that they are not very
closely related.  The first is that community organizers are not necessarily paid.  The
second difference concerns timing. The community organizer variable takes on a value
                                                          
20  In the case of community one this percentage is zero because there are no squatters.
For the remaining communities with zero, none of the existing squatters made
payments.
27
of one if an outsider operated as an organizer in the formation of the community. The
household variable, on the other hand, refers to payments made at the time that the
household arrived, which is often well after the establishment of the community.  An
authority or ‘boss’ might develop in a community that was not originally formed as an
organized invasion.  Finally, percent paid boss may indicate the extent, rather than
simply the presence, of an organizer’s influence.
Column seven shows the percentage of sample households occupying titled
properties in each community.  The untitled properties in the first four communities,
those which were not settled by an invasion, are encroachments by smaller numbers of
squatters on fringe areas of formal neighborhoods, such as steep slopes or the edges of
roads or parks.
Table 3 presents further characteristics of communities, as well as properties
and households, broken down by type of household.  As one would expect, untitled
squatters tend to own properties in younger communities and those which are further
from the city center.  The size of the lots obtained when squatting on land are far
smaller than purchased, titled, properties.  Households on untitled properties have
heads who are only slightly younger than those on titled property.  However they are
less educated and far less well off than other property owners.  This is true in terms of
per-capita expenditure, and even more dramatically in terms of household non-
property assets (durables and financial assets but excluding the residence).  Squatters
on untitled property average $910 in assets, whereas those on titled properties have
average assets valued at $2,020, and purchasers have average assets of $6,810.  Most
of the sample households have been occupying the same property for many years and
intend to stay almost indefinitely into the future, regardless of whether the property is
currently titled or not.  The indicator of household origin is rather a surprise given the
popular conception that the source of land invasions is migration from the surrounding
countryside.  Just 3.5% of households owning squatted, titled, property are headed by
someone who came from a rural area, while such households represent 12.3% of those
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renting titled property.  A similar difference exists for untitled properties.  It appears
that most squatters come from elsewhere in Guayaquil (or from Quito) and that, in
fact, the most common source of housing for rural migrants is the rental of property.
Finally, the last line of the table indicates that about 90% of the sampled households
have adult male members, a characteristic which is shown to be important in the
empirical results which follow.
Measures of Property Rights
The data include a multitude of variables which reflect both different sources of
property rights and variation in the strength of rights across households.  Because we
want to explore how the same features affect a number of different outcomes, such as
household tenure security or titling costs, we focus attention on the limited set of
variables listed above.  Experimentation has shown that these tend to have explanatory
power, and together they capture three distinct sources of property rights: individual
household authority and claims, the definition and enforcement activities of a
community boss, and the formal system backed by government authority.
The first set listed are household characteristics which may contribute to a
household's authority or claims.  These characteristics may help households assert their
Characteristics which Influence the Strength of Property Rights
    Set I - (CNS) Set II - (CNS / CT) Set III - (CT)
    Household Authority Informal
    and Potential Claims Community Enforcement              Formal System
      Income     A community organizer Title
      Assets     Percentage paid boss  Resolution of disputes by
      Education     Paid boss      courts, judges, or
      Adult males     Age of the community      the municipality
      Years of residence
      Not paying a boss in area where  Having an ownership Having an ownership
          many others have     document (?)       document (?)
29
rights individually.  For example, we expect that households with adult males may be
more able to assert their ownership claims.  These variables may also indicate that the
household has greater ability to access other mechanisms of property rights
enforcement (via better information, media attention, contacts, bribes).  For example,
having been resident for a long period may improve a household's expectation of being
able to call upon the informal or formal system.  All of these variables are indicators of
stronger but non-transferable ownership claims, CS
N .
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The second set are characteristics which indicate the presence of an informal
source of property rights beyond the household itself, while the third set indicate that
formal property rights operate.21  Having an ownership document could be either,
depending on the type of document. (Almost three-quarters of the owners of untitled
properties in our sample do have some form of ownership document.)  We expect the
two variables community age and whether disputes in a community are settled by
formal means to indicate the extent to which property boundaries in the neighborhood
are established, in addition, perhaps, to indicating the extent to which any specific
household has claims to a particular piece of property.  As discussed in Section II,
rights stemming from the presence of a community authority may be transferable or
not, depending on the attitude of the boss to the transfer, while all variables
representing the formal system will also contribute to transferable ownership claims,
CT.
 III. Security
In this section we investigate how different household and community
characteristics contribute to a household's feeling of tenure security or insecurity (see
Equation 1).  The fact that virtually all households seeking title report doing so in the
interest of increasing their security suggests that having a formal title effectively
diminishes the threat of  eviction.  However, we find that even untitled owners are not
particularly worried about eviction by the government, at least in the short run.  Each
                                                          
21 This distinction may be blurred.  On the one hand, a formal title deed may enhance
community recognition of ownership.  On the other, community-based rights may form
the basis of formal rights.   For example, Libecap (1989) recounts how, in the second
half of the 1800s, mining camps in the U.S. formed local, informal, rules for the
protection of squatters’ rights to mineral claims.  These were later recognized in the
federal Mining Laws of 1866 and 1872 which assigned private rights to these lands.
A recently initiated program in Peru to formalize untitled squatters in Lima (the
Registro Predial) accepts a declaration by a community leader or six neighbors as
proof of ownership.
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untitled household was asked what it viewed as the likelihood that it would be given an
eviction notice in the coming year.  The breakdown of responses is presented in Panel
A of Table 4.  Among all untitled squatters, only 22.5 percent allowed for any chance
of eviction.  These two findings may be reconciled by noting that low income
households may be very risk averse, making even a low probability of eviction costly
in utility terms (a point formalized in Feder, et. al., 1988).  These subjective
assessments of the risk of eviction are consistent with the recent history in Guayaquil.
There have been no evictions under the current municipal administration (thus for over
five years).
Although the threat of eviction is thought by all households to be low, the
probit results presented in Panel B indicate that there are some significant differences
across households in their willingness to assert that eviction is ‘impossible’.  In this
probit the dependent variable takes a value of one if eviction was said by a household
to be impossible and zero otherwise, so a positive coefficient implies that a variable
increases the household's feeling of security of tenure.  Two of the household authority
and claims variables are positive and significant ( years of residence and assets). The
number of years that a household has been resident has a substantial effect: a one
standard deviation increase in years (6.7) increases the probability by about seven
percentage points.  It should be noted that the positive effect that long years of
residence has on a household’s declared feeling of security could have two
interpretations.  The length of physical possession could increase rights because of
community recognition, as suggested above.  However, it could also have no effect on
rights but rather indicate a selection process at work.   Suppose, for example, that
households in the population have differing, and exogenous, probabilities of eviction in
any year, because of either some household or community characteristic.   Then one
would expect that the households remaining after many years would tend to be those
with the low eviction probabilities.  In other words, in this interpretation, years of
residence does not indicate an increase in a household’s rights due to the passage of
time, but rather signals the presence of some other feature which enhances the security
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of that household.
Community age and the formal enforcement of disputes are both insignificant.
While one would expect the clarity of property boundaries to contribute to overall
security of ownership, the question analyzed here is very specifically about short-term
security from government eviction.  The result suggests that, for the latter, the issue is
not the clarity of individual plot boundaries but whether squatters are likely to be
tolerated as ‘owners’ of property in an area at all.  The effect of having an ownership
document on security is marked, increasing the probability that eviction is considered
impossible by 17 percentage points.  Like years of residence, an ownership document
may either confer greater security or be a proxy for some unobservable characteristic
related to security.22
The presence of an informal source of property rights enforcement, in the form
of a boss who is being paid by many residents, has a very large and positive effect on
tenure security.  A one standard deviation increase in percent paid boss increases the
probability that a household will consider eviction impossible by 17 percentage points.
Organizers appear able to protect squatter communities from government  threats
(which may have something to do with the representation of politicians in their ranks).
Although it is not quite significant, it is worth noting here the ambiguous nature of the
variable paid boss.  On the one hand, the fact that a household paid a community boss
to obtain its property increases the likelihood that it will benefit from being under his
protective wing. Hence the appearance of paid boss in Set II, the measures of informal
rights, listed in above in Section III. On the other hand, finding that a household paid a
boss for the right to occupy a property in a neighborhood in which others did not might
suggest that it is in some way a weak household (both because weak households are
more likely to be obliged to pay, and because they may have more of an interest in
                                                          
22  This seems likely if the document comes from the government.  It may not: in some
periods in Guayaquil, squatters used certificates issued by the electricity company as
ownership documents (Caroline Moser, personal communication.)
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remaining in the protective good graces of the boss).   Thus paid boss also enters Set I,
the measures of household authority, but negatively. 23   The point estimate here
suggests that, controlling for the percentage of squatters in the same community having
paid a boss,  the fact that a household itself did so means that it is less likely to feel
secure--the second interpretation of  paid boss.
Controlling for the characteristics above, which increase informal rights and
therefore security, squatter households feel significantly more vulnerable in
communities where an invasion occurred on private land.  Private property owners are
more likely to fight in the courts to have invaders evicted. 24
Finally, we note that invasions are characterized by large numbers of
participants in order to raise the political costs of eviction (see Jimenez, 1985, for a
model of optimal number, where this benefit is balanced against congestion problems
associated with size).  In our data we do not find any evidence that community size
matters for perceived security, although this may simple be due to the fact that all of
our communities are quite large.  They range from 500 to 9,000 members, with a
                                                          
23 Conditional on the percentage who paid a boss, having paid a boss indicates being
one of the earlier squatters (paid boss is negatively related to the number of years
between the establishment of the community and the arrival of the property owner.)
Thus, another possible interpretation of the relationship between these two variables is
that being late is better for security, for example because only secure properties are
purchased by subsequent arrivals to a community.  However, an alternative dummy
variable, for whether the household is the original squatter, which captures this more
directly is not even remotely significant in this analysis so the interpretation given
appears appropriate.
24 This may seem entirely obvious but it is not: it has been noted elsewhere that private
owners who want to avoid fulfilling high quality zoning laws when developing
residential property (for example, a requirement to supply sewage connections to each
home or to maintain a minimum lot size) have staged invasions in return for payments
from the invaders for the substandard lots.  This would be consistent with our finding
that the lot sizes in invaded communities are considerably smaller than those in
communities that were formed otherwise.
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median size of 2,750.
V. The Ability to Contract
One of the theoretical benefits of having a formal property title highlighted in
Section II is that it facilitates land transactions--both sales and rental--by clarifying the
boundaries of  property, validating who has ownership rights, and making those rights
transferable with the signing over of a title deed.   To investigate this aspect of
property rights, we asked each property owner several sets of nested questions
regarding his ability to sell the property; rent the entire house; rent rooms or make
additions.  For  example, in one set of nested questions we asked whether the
household would be able to sell its property to someone outside of the community; if
no, whether they would be able to sell to someone inside of the community; and if no,
whether they would be able to sell to a relative or friend.  These were viewed as
hierarchical so a positive response finished the questioning.
If a household ever responded that it was able to sell, it was asked if permission
was necessary in order to do so.25  About 18 percent of the households responded that
they would need permission to sell their properties, but, surprisingly, they were evenly
split between titled and untitled owners.  This suggests that having title to a property
does not imply that the person claiming ownership has complete control over its
disposal.  How can one explain this? Although the numbers here are small, two pieces
of evidence suggest that the distribution of decision-making power within households
may be important.  Eighty percent of title recipients are women (interview, Ab. Jose
Javier Varas Calvo).26  In our sample over half of the households in which the
                                                          
25 In studies using data from Africa, more freedom from requirements to obtain lineage
approval for sales was used as a measure of the strength of transfer rights (Place and
Hazell, 1993; Besley, 1995).
26 Unfortunately, we do not know which family member is named in the title document
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respondent claimed to need permission to sell were headed by women (compared to
the one-quarter headed by women in the total sample of households) and, further, all of
the female-headed households where the respondent claimed to require permission to
sell were households in which an adult male was present.  Thus, it appears likely that
the titled households claiming to need permission to sell are either households which
are headed by a male but have the property deed in the name of a woman in the
household, or female-headed households where the permission of male family
members must be sought for a sale.
Transactions with Friends and Family and Outsiders
We first look to see whether simple patterns in responses to questions about
transactions with different parties fit the predictions of the model in Section II.  Only
on a few occasions did a household distinguish between being able to transact with
strangers inside versus outside the community.  Thus, in the analysis we reclassify the
responses as either being able to sell to an outsider; family or friends; or to no one.
We identify the (26) households with no adult males as being less able to assert their
ownership claims in the absence of other authority, that is, as having relatively low
non-transferable rights, CS
N .   If this identification is correct, the model leads to the
following predictions.  Households with no males should find it easier to sell.  They
should have a particularly strong advantage in sales to outside buyers.  This is because
they are both less demanding and because they engender less transfer uncertainty. In
our sample, 58% of households without males reported that they would be able to sell
their property to a friend or family member versus 41% of households with an adult
male.  The difference grows to 58% versus 35% when asked about sales to outsiders.
A second pair of predictions is that, as with sales, households with no males should
                                                                                                                                                                            
in our sample of titled households.   However,  we do know that, among 103 untitled
households who have some other ownership document, all of those headed by females,
and one-third of those headed by males, have the document in the name of a woman in
the household.
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find it easier to rent--when the person renting is a friend or family member.  On the
other hand, they may have more difficulty renting to outsiders.  When asked about
rental of the whole house, 38% of households without males said that they could rent
to a friend or family member versus only 30% among households with males. 27   But
when asked about rental to outsiders, the advantage of female-only households
disappears: 19% say that it is possible, versus 21% for households with males.   The
fact that the pattern of household responses matches (in point estimate) that predicted
by the model, supports the inclusion of transfer uncertainty as a feature of the
environment which is important to understanding the ability of households to engage in
land transactions.  It also supports our identification of female-only households as
having weaker non-transferable ownership claims.
Transferable Claims and the Ability to Transact
We next ask how property rights affect whether a household will be able to
transfer rights to its property in any form: that is either by renting out the entire house
(a transfer of usage rights) or by selling it (a transfer of complete ownership rights).
This is the relevant question from the point of view of a household which would like to
move to another part of the city, for instance if some member has found new
employment in a distant location or because the household has become wealthier over
time and would like to move to a better neighborhood.  In all, only 39 percent of the
sampled property owners reported that they would be able to contract, either by sale or
rental, with an outside buyer, and only an additional 14 percent said that they could
contract with a relative or friend.  Thus, while our sampled households appear to have
a quite strong sense of security of tenure (Table 4), almost half of them do not think
                                                          
27  We focus here on rental of the whole house, rather than of a room, for two reasons.
First, transfer uncertainty is likely to be most important when rental entails the absence
of the owner.  Second, in addition to transfer uncertainty, a household without males
may be relatively more reluctant to rent out a room to outsiders for reasons of personal
security and we do not want to conflate the two effects.
37
that they would be able to transfer their rights to others, even to relatives.
Table 5 presents results of a probit in which the dependent variable takes on the
value one if the household responded either that it could sell to an outsider or that it
could rent to an outsider, or both.   The title status of a property is endogenous, both
because households can choose to apply for title and because the government can
support or impede the process.28  Since it is possible that unobservable characteristics
of households or communities which facilitate or hinder land transfers might also
influence the likelihood that a household has obtained title, we compared results with
and without instrumenting for title in a linear probability model. 29  The qualitative
results were very similar so we present only the probit results here.
What is striking is the way in which the age of the community, whether there
was a community organizer, and formal title, as sources transferable claims, CT ,
substitute for one another in allowing owners to transfer property. Because of the
significance of the interaction between these variables, composite marginal effects are
presented  in Table 6.  Having a title is extremely important when trying to contract in
the early years of a community.  When a community is eight years old (one standard
deviation below the mean age), having title increases the probability of being able to
                                                          
28 This is well recognized.  Besley (1997) and Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau (1998),
for example, allow for the simultaneous nature of property rights and investment when
estimating  econometric models of the effect of rights on investment.
29 Identifying variables--distance, year of expected residence, home business
ownership,  and business and property tax levels-were jointly significant at a < 0.01.
We also tested for exogeneity of title more formally using a procedure developed in
Rivers and Vuong (1989) for probit models with an endogenous independent variable
(discussed in Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau, 1998, in a context similar to ours.)   This
involved including the residuals from a linear probability model of title as a regressor
in our transactions probit model, and then testing for their significance. We fail to
reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity (p-value = 0.79).  It should be noted, however,
that a condition required for the method to be valid is that, given title status, the
disturbances in the probit model be normally distributed. Using tests based on
skewness and kurtosis, we cannot reject the latter for untitled households.  However,
we can for titled households which suggests treating the result with some caution.
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transfer by 72 percentage points!  The size of this effect suggests that when a
community has recently been established there is considerable uncertainty about
property boundaries.  (Note that we are controlling for the number of years that the
household has been resident so the age of the community is not a proxy for uncertainty
about a specific household’s claims.)  Title continues to have a substantial effect even
when the community is 18 years old (the mean community age).  Comparing the last
two sets of probabilities, we see that the effect of title falls dramatically in
communities which were established as organized invasions.  At the mean community
age, having had a community organizer lessens the positive effect of title by 81% (25
percentage points).
We also find, in unreported results, that when  percent paid boss is included as a
measure of the presence of a community authority in place of community organizer,
both the estimated direct and interacted effects are insignificant.   One explanation of
this is that bosses who are paid have an incentive to obstruct transfers because they
want to extract further payments and fear losing control if ownership changes
(implying that paid bosses confer rights which are non-transferable).  While this may
be part of the story, it is not clear why they could not exert pressure on new residents
and, further, our sampled households report that almost all payments to organizers
were made at the time of arrival.  An alternative explanation is that it is less the current
presence of a community authority which is important, but his presence at the start of a
settlement.   As described in the introduction, one of the roles played by the organizers
is to allocate plots on invaded land to the squatters. 30 One would expect, therefore, that
having had a community organizer would make it more likely that a community has
clearly defined internal boundaries.  Together with the strong positive effect of the age
of a community, the differential effect of the variables community organizer and
                                                          
30 We visited land on the outskirts of Guayaquil which had been invaded two weeks
earlier.  The housing was rudimentary--boards and plastic--but the houses were laid out
in an obvious regular grid pattern with space for future roads.
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percent paid boss points to the importance of boundaries being clearly established for
transactions to occur.
Non-transferable Claims and the Ability to Transact
When investigating non-transferable claims it becomes important to distinguish
between the ability to sell and the ability to rent.   Because rental requires being able to
re-establish rights after being absent from the property, it requires the strongest
ownership claims.  On this account, it might be expected if a household was able to
rent it would be able to sell, but not necessarily vice versa.  However, this is not the
case.  In fact, as the chart below indicates, there is almost no hierarchy--14 percent of
the sample can sell but not rent, but there are also eight percent who say that they can
rent but not sell.  This finding indicates the importance of considering the potential
buyer’s interests, as in the model of Section II.   While a renter has no particular reason
to be concerned about the property owner’s individual claims (aside from a general
desire not to be occupying a property which is served by an eviction notice), this is not
true of a buyer.  He does care about the property owner’s claims and, in particular,
absent title  he is likely to want the current owner’s rights to be weak.  When rights are
formal, an owner can commit to giving up all of his claims to ownership by
transferring the title deed--the commitment is backed by the government. On the other
hand, an owner with strong informal rights may not be able to commit effectively to
honoring the transfer of rights after a ‘sale’.
Ability to Contract:   Observed Probabilities
 Number of squatters /
 Pct. of sample  (s.d.)
 Can Sell
          Yes                          No
 Can Rent            Yes    17 % (2.4)    8 % (1.7)
                             No    14% (2.2)   61 % (3.1)
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Table 7 gives two sets of probit results where we distinguish between the two
types of transactions. In the first, the dependent variable takes on the value one if the
household says that it could sell to an outside buyer, and in the second, the dependent
variable is one if the household says that it could rent its whole house to an outside
buyer.  The difference in effect across these two probits of having a titling program
underway in a community is striking.  Government titling program is a dummy
variable which takes on the value one if the community representative indicated that
the government had been in some why actively promoting titling in the community in
the past two years.  It has no effect on the probability that a household feels able to sell
its property, but a pronounced negative effect on its reported ability to rent.  The
existence of such a program lowers the latter probability by 17 percentage points.
Households clearly do not want to be absent from their properties when the
government is allocating formal claims.  This finding lends support to the idea that
physical possession of a property is an important contributor to establishing rights to
ownership.
Focusing on the characteristics representing household authority, which appear
in the final group of variables in Table 7, there are two very robust results.  First,
household wealth (assets) has a positive effect on being able to transfer property rights
by either rental or sale.  Since greater wealth would presumably make a household
more powerful, it is surprising that it facilitates sales given the potential concerns of a
buyer which were discussed above.   However, it is a small, if significant, effect.  The
truly striking result is in the differing effect across these two regressions of having
adult males in the household.  As predicted in Section II, among untitled households,
having adult males decreases the likelihood that a household will be able to sell its
property, by 45 percentage points.  At the same time, it has a strong positive effect on
being able to rent property.   In fact, it is so important that not a single one of the 14
untitled, female-only, households felt able to rent its property.  This renders the full set
of gender/title effects unestimable (being theoretically positive and negatively
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infinite), so we indicate only their signs in Table 7.  The strong positive effect of non-
transferable rights is consistent with the prediction of the model in situations where
transfer uncertainty is important and most renters are outsiders. 31
The pattern of interaction effects with title is also consistent with the
predictions of the model.  In both the sales and the rental market, title is predicted to be
most important for households with strong non-transferable rights.  This is confirmed
in the probit for the ability to sell by the fact that the estimated effect of title for male
households is positive and significant (1.91, estimated standard error, 0.56). This is
also confirmed for the rental market.  In unreported probit estimates, where the data
were restricted to include only households with males, we find that title increases the
probability that such households are able to rent by 69 percentage points (coefficient
2.87, p-value < 0.01).   On the other hand, title is predicted to have an ambiguous
effect for households with weak non-transferable rights, but positive if transfer
uncertainty is important, and particularly in the rental market.   Here we see the
ambiguity with respect to the sales market, where the effect of title for female-only
households is positive but insignificant.   The results for rental strongly support the
hypothesis that households with only women and children have relatively low levels of
household authority and thus fear that they will not be able to reclaim their property
after a rental period without another sources of claims.  As noted above, not a single
female-only household thought itself able to rent unless it had title. A general
implication of these sets of results is that transfer uncertainty is a real concern of
households trying to engage in property transactions in this environment.
VI.  Title and Property Value
                                                          
31 Note that the switch in signs rules out another explanation for the reported greater
ability to sell among female-only households: that women respondents are culturally
more predisposed to respond ‘yes’ to questions.
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We now turn to the effect of the various sources of property rights on the value
of property.  In previous studies, the effect of titling on property values has been
estimated by including a dummy variable for title in hedonic price equations.  One
drawback of this approach is the endogeneity of title status which was discussed
above.  There may be unobservable characteristics of properties or communities which
influence both the value of the property and whether the owner has obtained title.
Other authors have addressed this problem by instrumenting for title, as well as by
including rich sets of controls for observable housing and community characteristics.
Because we were able to control the design of the survey, we have adopted an
alternative approach to this question.  For each household which claimed that it was
able to sell its property, we asked the respondent to give an estimated sale value.
Among this group, the owners of untitled properties were then asked what they felt
they could obtain in a sale of their property if were in a titled state.  Similarly, titled
owners were asked if they thought that they would be able to sell their properties if the
properties were not, in fact, titled and, if so, what price they thought that they could
obtain.32  Thus, for a subset of our owners (51 respondents) we have their estimates of
the difference in the sale price that they would receive if they were to sell their
properties in each state.  These ‘within respondent’ differences in values allow us to
estimate the effect of title controlling for all unobservable characteristics--those of the
community, the property and the household, including RS.33
Table 8 presents the results of a weighted regression of the log of the difference
in sale value expected by household when a property changes from untitled to titled.
                                                          
32  We were careful always to ask a household whether something was possible before
asking them to estimate a price.  This was to avoid forcing respondents to put
meaningless values on transactions that they do not view as reasonable.  Our view is
that the resulting loss of observations is made up for in higher quality information.
33 In a similar way, Alston, Libecap and Schneider (1995) asked 13 untitled squatters
in rural Brazil to estimate the current value of their properties, and then the value of
their properties with formal title.  The respondents’ estimates ranged from a zero to a
100% increase in value, with an (unconditioned) average increase of 36%.
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Thus, the coefficients represent interaction effects - the extent to which the effect of
title on property value is enhanced or diminished by the indicated variable.  The fact
that the dependent variable is in logs, and the absence of observed quality
characteristics of the properties as explanatory variables, implies that we are imposing
the functional form restriction that the strength of property rights has a proportional
effect on the value of properties of all quality levels.  The same restriction has been
imposed in other, hedonic, price studies.
Before turning to an examination of the results, it is worth noting that these
‘within’ estimates may not be exactly comparable to the results of hedonic value
regressions.   In the latter, the person stating the value of the property is only being
asked to estimate the value of something he already owns.  Here, the respondent is also
being asked to estimate value in a hypothetical state.  It may be that an untitled owner
is less informed about property values in a titled market and vice versa.  If this just
leads them to make noiser predictions it will not bias our results.  If, on the other hand,
titled owners have title because they perceive it to be valuable, and untitled owners do
not have title because they see it as not being valuable, their hypothetical estimates
may not reflect true values in a given state.  We use the fact that the prediction bias
goes in opposite directions for titled and untitled owners to test for this effect.  We test
whether the current status of the respondent’s property  leads to differences in the size
of the expected change in value with title by including it as a separate regressor
(unreported regression).  It is insignificant so there is no evidence in the data of bias in
the property value estimates given for hypothetical states.
Recall that the percentage change in the expected transaction price with an
increase in transferable rights, ¶P/¶CT , was predicted to be positive (see Section II).
In Table 8 we see that this is confirmed empirically.  The unconditional expected mean
effect of titling a property is to raise its expected sale price: by an estimated 23.5
percent.  This estimate is comparable to the effect of title found in hedonic price
equations using urban data from Manila and Davao. In these cities, being titled was
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estimated to raise the value of property by 14 and 58 percent, respectively (Jimenez,
1984; Friedman, Jimenez and Mayo, 1988). 34
In the first group of variables, we again see the way in which title, age and, in
this case, percent paid boss, substitute for one another as sources of transferable
claims.   Both community age, and the fact that many households paid a boss, make
title significantly less important.  Age is particularly influencial: the impact of title is
40 percentage points lower in a community which has been in existence for 14 years
(the mean) than it is in a community just after its establishment.  35  The impact of title
is seven percentage points lower in communities where a third of the households paid a
boss (again the mean) compared to its impact in a community where none of the
squatters paid a boss.  The fact that official institutions such as courts and judges are
resolving disputes in the community ( formal enforcement) strongly reduces the
importance of title in raising property values.  Again, this could be an indicator of the
extent to which property boundaries are settled and recognized.  Somewhat
surprisingly, given the positive effect of distance on security from eviction indicated in
Table 4, title appears more important in more distant communities.
Turning to the second group of variables in Table 8, which are indicators of
non-transferable ownership claims, we see, first of all, that in point estimate, all of the
non-transferable claims variables dampen the effect of title on price. 36 The coefficient
                                                          
34 Two related results, for rural areas, are reported in Alston, et. al. (1995) and in
Feder, et. al. (1988).  The former find that title increased the value of land 40 km from
market by an estimated 72% in Brazil, while the latter find increases of 25, 56, 113 and
133% in each of four provinces in Thailand.
35 This confirms the result in Friedman , et. al. (1988) where they find a 50% price
premium for titled properties among those newly settled, falling to a 33% premium
after ten years.
36 In light of this finding we can comment on a potential selection problem.  If there
are characteristics of households or communities which affect claims and which are
unobservable to us but observable to potential buyers, then having restricted ourselves
to a sample of households which can sell in any state could mean that we have selected
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on wealth (assets) is not significant here, which is somewhat surprising given its
significance in explaining security (Table 4) and the ability to transact (Table 7).
However, those on years of residence and male are significant.  In particular,
households with only women and children gain a vastly greater price increase from
title than households with adult males.  The interaction effects at the bottom of the
table indicate that the expected sale value of a property owned by a female-only
household in a newly established neighborhood increases, on average, 46% with title.
The only model of price determination which is consistent with this finding is one
where price is the minimum acceptable to sellers (see Appendix, Equation A.8).  In
that case, title has two positive effects: it lowers transfer uncertainty and raises
minimum acceptable prices.  We expect the first effect to be most important to
households with males, and the second effect to be more important to female-only
households.  Since we have a negative coefficient on the interaction of males with title,
it suggests that the second effect dominates  (that is, ¶q¤¶CT¶ CS
N  > 0 small, and
¶US¤¶CT¶ CS
N
  << 0).  However, there is evidence that the combination of being a
household with males and having been resident on the property for a long period
together constitute a threat to potential buyers.  For households with males, longer
residence increases the positive effect of title on property values.  (See the summary of
the interaction effects at the bottom of the table.)
VII.  The Costs and Duration of Titling
Having derived quantitative estimates of some of the benefits that households
gain from having formal title, we turn in this section to an examination of the costs of
titling.   Each squatter household which had obtained title by the time of the survey
                                                                                                                                                                            
households with either high levels of these unobservables if they are transferable or
low levels if they are non-transferable.  Given that the former would bias the estimated
effect of title downwards, and the latter, given the results just presented, would bias the
estimated effect of title upward, there is no clear prediction about the direction in
which a selection bias would go.
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was asked how long it had taken it to obtain title and the cost.   Squatter households
remaining untitled were asked to estimate these values, as were the community
respondents in those communities with squatters. We restrict our attention to the
sample of 142 households providing estimates, so as not to combine inconsistent
data.37  Summary statistics of the responses are in Panel A of Table 9.
The first two columns in Panel A give sample statistics for the number of
months it takes to obtain title.  Although anecdotal evidence suggests that titling may
take a very long time, the median values given by the households and thirteen
community respondents are similar and quite short: 6 and 4 months respectively. 38
There is, however, considerable variation in views among the household respondents.
Their expectations about the time it would take to obtain a title range from zero to
almost 15 years.  The bottom two rows of Panel A indicate how many of the
respondents answered zero, and gives the mean after dropping these respondents.
Here this makes little difference and the mean is close to two years.
The third and forth columns of Panel A give the same information, but for
estimates of the cost of titling.  Including the 29 households who expect titling to be
costless, the mean value is $44 with a median of $29.  Again there is considerable
                                                          
37  The actual, historical, figures are very substantially larger than those estimated by
untitled households.  There are two reasons for thinking that this is an artifact of our
incorrectly adjusting for inflation.  First, the timing of payments was not known
precisely and had to be estimated.  Second, some of the respondents may have
converted to current values in giving their responses, making our conversion to 1996
an over-adjustment.  Durations over 15 years and costs over $500 were treated as
outliers and deleted from the data presented here.  This removed one household for
each question.
38 Obtaining title requires that the property be surveyed, that title be approved by the
Directorate of Properties and Parroquial Services, signed by the Director of Properties,
the Chief of Legalization of Parcels, the Municipal Secretary, and the Mayor, and then
registered in the cadastre by the Department of Urbanization, Valuation and Registry.
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variation, from zero to $286.  The community respondents demonstrate a similar
variation in estimates, although they tend to be more sanguine about costs overall with
a mean estimate of $29 and median of $11.  In this case, dropping the zeros has a
noticeable effect on the mean, and is probably appropriate since the municipality does
charge households for the land when they are titled, as well as a small ($0.71)
administrative fee.  The official cost of an average plot,  not including payments to
lawyers, and so on, ranges from $1.3 to $29.3, depending on the community
(interview, Ab. Jose Javier Varas Calvo).  Our figures are consistent with these fees
reported by the municipality.  They are also close to titling costs reported by Alston,
Libecap and Schneider (1995) for a small sample of seven squatters in rural Parà,
Brazil.   Their estimates of the total costs of obtaining title, including the opportunity
cost of time, range from $12 to $60, with a median value of $24 (1992 US dollars).
Panel B of Table 9 presents regression results which help to explain some of the
large variation in the estimates of the duration and cost of titling reported by
households (although the R2’s indicate that much of the variation remains
unexplained).   Squatters in more distant communities expect to face dramatically
lower costs of titling.  A one standard deviation increase in the distance from the city
center lowers expected costs by 90%.  A striking finding is the importance in the titling
process of whether the land invaded was originally  privately or publicly owned.
Squatters on private land expect titling to be both much faster (by almost two years),
and much more expensive (a one hundred percent increase in price).    The fact that
there was resistance during an invasion does not, as one might expect, suggest to
squatters that titling will take more time, and further, it lowers their estimate of costs.
When the municipality is running a titling program in a community it naturally lowers
the residents’ expectations about how long it will take to get a title, although not the
costs.  Finally, we see from the coefficient on the size of the property that the costs of
titling increase with lot size.   However, a 10% increase in square meters increases
expected costs by just 5%, indicating that there are large economies of scale, with
relatively higher costs faced by the smaller property owners.  None of the variables
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related to the activities of community organizers, or to household characteristics, were
significant determinants of the expected duration, or costs, of titling.
VIII. Conclusions
The results presented in this paper show that the value of formal property rights
to low- and middle-income urban households is very dependent on the other types of
ownership claims available to them.  Using a variety of empirical indicators,  we have
identified multiple sources of informal rights which appear to be important in urban
Ecuador.  These include household characteristics which influence its individual
authority or its ability to access other sources of rights.   For example, household
wealth and years of residence are important, as one might expect.  However,  we also
find that having adult male members greatly enhances a household’s ability to assert
its ownership claims.  A second important source of rights stems from the activities of
a community organizer or boss.  These may include defining plot boundaries,
identifying and enforcing individuals’ claims, and protecting a community from the
threat of eviction by the government.
In our modeling and empirical work we have emphasized that there are two
ways in which conferring formal rights might increase the welfare of squatter
households: by increasing households’ security from eviction or boundary disputes and
by reducing the transfer uncertainty associated with transactions undertaken in an
environment where all rights are informal.   When a buyer cannot be sure that a
household will  honor the ‘sale’ of its property, and when a property owner cannot be
sure that a renter will honor his commitment to leave, households have a more limited
range of people with whom they can transact, perhaps including only friends and
family members.  In general this limitation impedes the allocation of properties to
households who would value them most.   It is particularly detrimental to households
needing, for example, to move to new locations for work or with growing families in
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need of more space.39   Further, just as transfer uncertainty limits a household’s ability
to sell its property, it limits a bank’s ability to repossess property, lowering the value
of property as a collateral asset.  In future work we plan to investigate the use of
property in the credit market in the surveyed communities.
In the model of transactions and property value developed here we highlight the
fact that, while all  sources of ownership claims have the positive effect of contributing
to security, rights derived from household authority or claims are different from those
derived from an outside source in an important way: it is typically not possible to
transfer such rights to another party nor is it possible to commit to not exercising them
after an agreed transfer.  As a result, informal, household-based, sources of stronger
property rights, exactly because they increase the security of the current owner, may
impede property transactions by raising transfer uncertainty.
The empirical results support the idea that transfer uncertainty is a real concern
of households transacting in this environment.  Households with adult males, which
have strong, but non-transferable, claims, find it significantly more difficult to sell -
they represent a greater threat to potential buyers.  But in renting property, where the
transfer uncertainty is on the side of the owner, it is female-only households who face
greater difficulty transacting - they are less able to claim property back.  In this
environment, titling property can increase welfare by allowing parties to commit to
agreed transactions.  When selling property it is households with males who stand to
gain the most from formal property rights.  When renting property it is households
without males who gain the most.
Given that most of the surveyed households expect to remain on their properties
for a very long time, a more important welfare consideration may simply be the
increase in security that households derive from living on a property over which they
                                                          
39  In our data, families range from one up to thirteen members .
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feel they have stronger ownership rights.  Thus, we investigate how various sources of
informal rights affect households’ perceptions of their short-run security from eviction
by the government. Community organizers are very important: a one standard
deviation increase in the percentage of squatters paying a community boss increases
the probability that eviction is deemed ‘impossible’ by 17 percentage points.  Eviction
is also of less concern in communities which have been in existence for many years.
Household characteristics, such as wealth and years of residence are also important in
increasing security.  One reason that households might value security of tenure is that
it allows them to capture the benefits of long term investments in their housing or in
their communities.  In future work we plan to investigate these investment incentive
effects of property rights.
Finally, to calculate the aggregate effect that obtaining title would have on the
utility of households with varying levels of informal rights, we estimate, in difference
form, hedonic price regressions.  Using our model of property transactions, we show
that changes in  prices arising from title will reflect not only changes in the utility
value of property but also changes in uncertainty.  This is important for interpreting the
effect of title in the ‘within household’ estimates presented here, as well as in more
traditional hedonic price equations.  In particular, since transfer uncertainty falls when
a property is titled, the percentage change in transaction prices arising from titling
property overestimates the utility value of title.  This means that our estimated mean
price change of 23.5% is an upper bound on the household gain in the utility of
property ownership.
We have focused on benefits, but titling is not free and it i s important to
consider also costs. To put those presented in Section VII in perspective, it is useful to
compare them to the resources available to households.  We find that the estimated
cost of obtaining a title represents, on average, 102% (s.d. 12.4) of household annual,
per capita, consumption.  Although the costs may be spread out over time, they clearly
represent a substantial expense for squatter households.    On the other hand, a
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cost/benefit analysis would suggest that it is an expense which pays off.  Among the 47
households reporting a value for a ‘similar property sold in the community in the past
year’,  estimated titling costs represent, on average, 6.3% of the value of the property
(s.d. 2.0), with a median of 1.5%.40   Even allowing for the fact that our estimates are
upper bounds, it would appear that the private benefits of title are substantially higher
than the private costs.  This may explain why almost all of the untitled squatters in our
sample declare that they are trying to obtain a title.
Throughout the discussion we have also restricted our attention to the
implications for owners of changes in property rights.  These do not necessarily
correspond to their implications for social welfare.  Feder,  et. al. (1988) suggest a
number of reasons to think that the private value of formalizing property rights exceeds
the social value.  For example, having a lower risk of eviction is overvalued by owners
because they do not take into account the utility of those who use the property in their
place if an eviction occurs.  The value of title in facilitating access to the formal credit
market is also overvalued relative to the social value if lower interest rates in the
formal market are due to government subsidies. Using a number of assumptions about
risk aversion, the divergence between the opportunity cost of capital and the formal
interest rate, credit supply and probabilities of eviction in their four Thai provinces,
Feder, et. al., calculate that that the gross social benefit of titling is at most half of the
private value.  In so far as the full costs of establishing and maintaining a formal
system of rights are not passed on to title recipients, the social costs of titling will also
be higher than the private costs.  Although data are sparse, this divergence is likely to
be substantial.  Thus, one would need to expect quite substantial net private benefits to
flow from a move towards stronger formal property rights before concluding that
social welfare would be enhanced thereby.
                                                          
40 This is a somewhat higher percentage than that found by Feder, et. al. (1988) for
rural Thailand, where they estimate total costs to farmers of obtaining title at less than
1% of the value of the untitled land.   However, given the small size of urban plots,
and the economies of scale in titling, the findings are not inconsistent.
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Finally, although the presence of transfer uncertainty prevents our pinning
down the precise magnitude of the private welfare effect of titling properties, we can
draw some conclusions about when it will be relatively more important. First, the age
of the community and the activity of a community organizer substitute for title as
sources of transferable claims.  Second, title is particularly important in increasing
expected sale values for female-only households.  Because these households engender
less transfer uncertainty, price changes will tend to overestimate utility changes for
such households to a lesser extent than they do for households with males.  Thus we
can confidently conclude that formal property rights confer the greatest utility benefit
on households with only women and children.  In sum, our results suggest that for
titling programs to impart a significant benefit to the recipients, they should be targeted
at more recent, and disorganized, squatter communities and care should be taken that
more vulnerable households have access to the program. 41
                                                          
41 This raises the important question of whether such a policy would create an
(unwanted) incentive for more rapid migration into the city onto fringe areas not
intended for settlement.  It nevertheless remains that targetting older communities to
avoid this potential problem may confer few benefits on the residents.
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Appendix
 
Using the model described in Section II, and under the single property
assumption, we first derive outside buyers’ expectations about a seller’s level of q, a
characteristic which is, to them, unobservable.  We use this to determine the maximum
price, P , that an outsider buyer would pay for the seller’s property.  Using the
assumption that a transaction is possible whenever P £ P , we then find the necessary
wedge between US and UB needed for a trade to occur.  This is denoted gO.   In the
second and third subsections we examine the comparative static effects of changes in
ownership claims on the probability of being able to transact, and on transaction prices.
The final subsection extends the model to a world where owners may have more than
one property.
The Calculation of  E[q] and gO
As discussed in Section II, the maximum price that an outside buyer would be
willing to pay for a property is P  = E[q]UB.  To determine this price, the buyer must
form an expectation of q.  As in a ‘Lemons’ model (Akerlof, 1970), because of adverse
selection the average quality of the seller households which would agree to sell at a
given price P is itself a function of the price.  Specifically, at P, the maximum level of
q that a household could have and still be willing to sell is  q* = min[
P
U S
, 1]  (see
Equation 4).  For expositional simplicity we assume that eS = 1, for all S, so that US
depends only on observables, allowing us to  write:
E[q| P, US]  =  q q q
q
q
u d( )
*
ò   = 
1
2
[q + 1] if US  <  P (A.1)
=  
1
2
[q + 
P
U S
 ] if US  ³  P,
where u(.) is a uniform distribution from q  to 1. When US  <  P there is no selection -
the buyer knows that even the most reliable sellers would be in the market at this price.
These definitions of E[q] generate two definitions of P , P1  and P2 ,  as follows:
P  = P1    =  UB 
( )1
2
+ q
  if US   <  P1 , and (A.2)
= P2    =  UB 
( )qU
U U
S
S B2 -
if US    ³  P2 .
Now, US    <  P1 Þ US     < P2
US    >  P1 Þ US    >  P2
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US    =  P1 Þ US    =  P2 , 
which together imply that, for a given UB and q, there exists a unique P  for each US.  It
is defined as P = min[ P1  , P2 ].
42
Assuming that a trade will occur whenever P £ P , it follows from this
definition that a transaction is possible with a buyer who is an outsider whenever
UB  ³  
2q
q q+
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú US  =   
2 2 1
2 1
q q
q q
+ -
+ -
é
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US  =   gO US. (A.3)
Comparative Statics: The Ability to Transact
We consider first the effect of an increase in the strength of non-transferable
claims on the probability, q, of being able to sell a property to a potential buyer of type
i (see Equation 7 for the definition of q):
¶
¶
¶ n
¶
¶ n
¶
¶ g
¶q
¶q
¶
q
C
f
C C
C
C C
C CS
N
S
N T
S
N
B
N T
S
N
i
S
N= - - +
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú(.)
ln ( , ) ln ( , ) ln
   <  0. (A.4)
The first term in the square brackets is positive, but the second is always zero: buyers
do not get security benefits from increases in the non-transferable claims of the seller.
The third term is zero for F buyers but is positive for outside buyers: with the claims of
the seller increasing relative to those of the buyer, the transfer uncertainty of the buyer
rises (see Assumptions Set 2).  Both effects would become less important in situations
where there are strong transferable rights associated with the property.   However,
regardless of the characteristics of the property and the parties, in any matching of
buyers and sellers the likelihood that they will be able to contract will fall in the non-
transferable claims of the current owner.
                                                          
42 If one relaxes the assumption that eS = 1, the outside buyer can condition only on the
observable characteristics of the seller’s utility, nS, when forming his expectation of q,
and eS is integrated out.  This leads to the following form for P , which is an average of
P1  and P2 :
P = P1 G
P
S
1
n
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú + P dG
P
S S
S
2
1 n
e e
¥
ò ( ) ( ) , where
Where G(.) is the cumulative distribution function for eS.  Derivations become
notationally cumbersome and no additional insights are obtained from this more
general formulation, so we maintain the assumption that eS = 1 in the text.
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Now consider the effect of an increase in transferable claims, CT, on the
probability of being able to sell a property:
¶
¶
q
CT
 =  -f(.)
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¶
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ln ( , ) ln ( , ) lnC C
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C C
C C
S
N T
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T- +
é
ë
ê
ù
û
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>
<
 0 . (A.5)
Both of the first two terms in the square brackets are now positive.  The seller is more
demanding as his security increases, but now the buyer is willing to pay more since he
too would receive the utility benefit of greater security.  Their relative size depends on
CS
N  and CB
N .  If CS
N = CB
N  then the first two terms cancel.  To go further, recall that an
increase in one type of ownership claim has a lesser effect when other claims are
stronger (see Assumptions Set 1).  Thus, if the seller has non-transferable claims which
are lower than the median level for potential buyers, an increase in CT will have a more
pronounced impact on the seller than on most buyers and the first term will, more than
half the time, dominate the second: perversely, the likelihood of a transaction with a
randomly arriving potential buyer will fall!  If the selling household has strong non-
transferable claims the second term will most often dominate: the likelihood of a
transaction will rise.  The third term captures the change in transfer uncertainty.  It is
zero for F buyers but positive for outside buyers, facilitating exchange (Assumptions
Set 2).
To contrast the effect of enhanced transferable claims on the ability to sell of
households with differing levels of non-transferable claims consider:
¶
¶ ¶
2q
C CT S
N   =  -f(.)
¶ n
¶ ¶
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2 2ln (.) ln
C C C CT S
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ú    >   0. (A.6)
The cross-partial is strictly positive.  Together with the comments under (A.4), this
suggests that an increase in CT will have a positive effect on the probability of being
able to sell among households with strong CN.  There will be a lesser effect of CT on
the ability to sell among households with weak CN, possibly even negative within
families.
We analyze the rental market similarly (but only sketch out the results here).
The important distinction between the markets is that a rental contract is for a
temporary transfer.  As a result, the concern about transfer uncertainty switches to the
seller, who expects to retrieve his property after the rental period.  Letting q continue
to represent the probability that a transaction is honored, a condition like Equation (6)
again applies, with  g ³ 1 and decreasing in q.  The sole difference is that q is now
increasing in CS
N , that is, a stronger seller improves the chance that a contract is
honored.  The comparative static results of changes in CT and CS
N  on the probability of
being able to rent are the same as those discussed above for the probability of being
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able to sell, except for the third, transfer uncertainty, term.  The effect of CT working
through the third term continues to be positive but, unlike for sales, having transferable
claims increases the probability of being able to rent more for households who have
weak non-transferable rights.  The effect of CS
N  working through the third term
switches signs to become positive.
Comparative Statics: Transactions Prices
What happens to observed transactions prices when formal rights, CT, are
increased?43  Taking logs of the price equation, we can write the resulting percentage
change in the price between the household and a given buyer as follows:
¶
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¶ q
¶q
¶q
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ln ln lnP
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CT T
S
T= +     >  0. (A.7)
The fall in transfer uncertainty associated with formal rights means that, in
expectation, ‘more’ of the property is being sold (the first term).  The enhanced
security conferred by formal rights also makes the seller more demanding (the second
term).  For both reasons, price increases in formal rights.  However, it is not clear from
the model how the importance of formal rights will change with the strength of non-
transferable rights:
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To the extent that transfer uncertainty is an issue, the first term in (A.8), which is
positive, suggests that more authoritative households will find formal rights
particularly useful in attaining high prices for their properties.  The second term is
negative, however.  Strong households experience less of an increase in their security
when they obtain formal rights and so become, relatively, less demanding.
We now consider the upper bound for the transac tions price, P , where the
seller obtains all of the surplus from transactions.  This price is either qUB, if it is an F
buyer, or as defined above, if an outside buyer.  Under this alternative assumption
                                                          
43 Equations (A.7) and (A.8), which follow, describe changes in the transaction price
between the household and a given buyer.  In general, determining the change in the
expected price requires us to consider also changes in the pool of buyers: that is, those
who satisfy the criterion in Equation (6).  When price is the seller's price, the
distribution of UB in the pool does not matter so (A.7) and (A.8) capture all effects. For
P , changes in CT and CS
N  imply changes in the composition of buyers making a
transaction.  We assume that this ‘selection effect’ is small as its inclusion requires
integrating over all unknown distributions of claims.
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about the division of the surplus we have, for F:
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Again price is increasing formal rights.  In this case, we also have the unambiguous
result that formal rights will have a greater effect on the sale price for households with
strong non-transferable rights because the two types of rights only interact in the
reduction of transfer uncertainty.
For outside buyers, the change in price depends on whether P1 or P2  applies:
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When P1  applies, increasing formal rights unambiguously increases the transactions
price.  When P2 applies it is less clear cut.
44  The first two terms in the derivative are
positive.  However, the effect of formal rights on price is also sensitive to the relative
change in the utilities of buyer and seller (the value in square brackets).  The reason for
this is that a fall in US relative to UB ensures a better quality pool of sellers (with lower
Us they lose less from giving up their properties, so more reliable sellers remain in the
market).  This lessens the asymmetric information problem and thereby raises the
                                                          
44 Relaxing the assumption that eS = 1, as in the previous footnote, we have
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maximum offer of the buyer.  The sign of the term in square brackets is positive or
negative as the observable part of the buyer’s utility, nB, is less or greater than that of
the seller, nS (because of the negative cross-partial - see Assumptions Set 1).   Thus, as
in the previous subsection, if the non-transferable claims of the seller are higher than
the median buyer, this term will most often be positive.   If lower, then it will most
often be negative.  On this account, for a given set of buyers, formal rights will have a
larger impact on price among more authoritative selling households.  In neither case is
it possible to sign the second derivative.
Multiple Transactions
We now assume that each household S has a second property (or durable good)
which it may wish to sell.   Transactions occur at maximum price that the seller will
offer.  We assume that all buyers are friends and family members, who are perfectly
informed about the actions of the seller and use the following strategy:
In determining P , assume (correctly) that the probability that a seller will try to renege
on a sale is  l( CS
N ,CT), so that the probability a transaction is honored becomes [(1-l)
+ lq].  If the seller ever does try to renege, refuse to purchase any subsequent
properties from him.
Below we derive the condition for it being the optimal strategy for a household to
choose to try to reclaim its first property after a sale, despite the fact that this
behaviour prevents it from selling the second good to a friend or family member.  Then
we examine how ownership claims affect the likelihood that the condition is fulfilled.
The equilibrium, as stated, is not subgame perfect, since, if a seller does try to
reclaim the first property, there may be friends and family who so value the second
property that they would like to deviate from punishment in the second market and still
transact with the seller.  We assume that this finite period, property transactions, game
is just one component of an infinite repeated game going on among this connected
group.  In this larger game, the group can devise strategies in which members are
punished if they do not adhere to the above strategy and punish a deviant. 45
                                                          
45 An alternative approach would be to model the property market itself as an infinitely
repeated game (or finite with an uncertain endpoint).   The strategy of the friends and
family in this case is to assume that the seller will try, with probability l, to renege if
he has not yet done so, and that he will try with probability one otherwise.  In this case,
deviants can still transact in subsequent markets, but are punished by obtaining a lower
price in all future transactions.  The equilibrium is subgame perfect because, on the
one hand, it is optimal for sellers to try to reclaim all properties after the first given the
strategy of buyers, and, on the other, those buyers who wish to transact with a seller,
given that he will try to renege, are free to do so.   Because the optimal strategy of the
seller in this case depends on several differences in expected  maximums  (over the
choices of not selling, selling honestly, and selling and trying to cheat) it is
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Expected total returns if the household attempts to reclaim are,
P + (1-q)US + US2. (A.11)
If the household does not try to reclaim its first property, its expected returns are
P  + E[ max{US2, P2 + (1-q) US2}]. (A.12)
In order to specify the expected gains from trade term, recall that a transaction with a
potential F buyer occurs whenever UB > US, or, equivalently, whenever lneB > lnnS -
lnnB (Equation 7 in the text).   Denoting the RHS of this inequality by D, we have,
E[max{US2, P2 +(1-q)US2}] =
-¥
¥
ò [  US2 F(D) + { ( ) } (ln )
D
B B S BU dF
¥
ò + -qn e q e2 2 2 21 ]  dH(C BN ), (A.13)
where H(.) is the cumulative distribution of non-transferable claims in the population
of buyers.  Thus, the household will try to reclaim its first property if and only if,
(1-q)US   >  
-¥
¥
ò  q n e e{ } (ln )
D
B B S BU dF
¥
ò -2 2 2 2  dH(C BN ). (A.14)
Let l( CS
N ,CT) denote the probability that the inequality holds, making an
attempt to reclaim the optimal strategy.  We turn now to an examination of the
derivatives of l.  Their being opposite in sign to the derivatives of q is a sufficient
condition for the comparative static results in the one good case to go through.
Consider first changes in the non-transferable claims of the seller, CS
N , on l. To
interpret the effect of a change in the strength of these claims, we use the following
relationships,
¶q
¶CS
N £ 0,    
¶
¶
U
C
S
S
N ,
¶
¶
U
C
S
S
N
2  > 0,    
¶n
¶
B
S
NC
= 0,     
¶
¶
D
CS
N  > 0.
It follows from these relationships that the LHS of the inequality in (A.14) is strictly
increasing in the non-transferable claims of the seller.  Retaining the property becomes
more valuable, and success in reclaiming becomes more likely, both of which make
                                                                                                                                                                            
notationally cumbersome to derive comparative static results.  Thus, we stay with the
simpler (and perhaps more plausible given the limited assets of households) situation
described in the text.
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the strategy of trying to reclaim more attractive. On the other hand, the value on the
RHS of (A.14) is strictly decreasing.  The potential gains from exchange fall as the
seller’s own utility from the second good goes up.  At the same time, as q  and, thus q,
go down, the buyer and seller effectively exchange a smaller part of the second good
and less of the potential gains from trade are captured by the seller.    This, of course,
makes the ability to access this market less interesting.   Thus,
¶l
¶CS
N   >  0,  which is the opposite sign to 
¶q
¶CS
N £  0.
Now consider changes in the transferable claims, CT , on l.  Now we refer to
the relationships:
¶q
¶CT
³ 0,     
¶
¶
U
C
S
T , 
¶
¶
U
C
S
T
2 > 0 ,    
¶n
¶
B
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> 0,     
¶
¶
D
CT
 
>
<
 0.
Here the results are more ambiguous.  If security concerns are minimal and
transactions uncertainty important, even in the absence of formal rights, as supported
by the empirical results in this paper, then the LHS of the inequality in (A.14) will
decrease in CT.  As the likelihood of success fades, trying to reclaim sold property
becomes a less attractive strategy.  On the RHS, 
¶
¶
D
CT
< 0 and any increase in q will
tend to dominate any small changes in potential gains from exchange.  That is, a larger
part of the second property is, in effect, ‘traded’, allowing the seller to capture more of
the gains from trade. Thus, the RHS is likely to increase.   Together,
¶l
¶CT
 < 0, which
is again opposite in sign to 
¶q
¶CT
³  0.
However, when transaction uncertainty is less important, so that 
¶q
¶CT
is small,
and the main effect of transferable rights is through the greater utility attained by
household from enhanced security, we may obtain the opposite result.   This situation
is most likely to arise when the non-transferable rights of the seller are low, since this
makes the effect of increased transferable rights on q weaker, and on US and US2
stronger.  In this situation, the effect of CT on the LHS of the inequality in (A.14) may
be positive.  This will go hand in hand with 
¶
¶
D
CT
on the RHS becoming positive, as
well as a fall in the potential gains from trade as US2 increases, both effects rendering
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the RHS smaller.  Thus,
¶l
¶CT
 could be positive.  Although it is difficult to sign the
effect of transferable rights on the probability that a selling household will try to
reclaim its first property after a sale, we can say that it is less negative (or more
positive) when non-transferable rights are weak.  That is,
¶l
¶ ¶C CT S
N   <  0, which again is opposite in sign to 
¶q
¶ ¶C CT S
N  ³  0.
Table 1
Numbers of Households: by Type and Title Status
                          Title Status                   
Household Type Total Titled Untitled Unknown
  Purchasers  22   22   --  --
Squatters 255 113 142  --
   Have tried to
   obtain titlea 229 113 116  --
     Not trying  26  --  26  --
Non-ownersb 123  73  33  17
All Households 400 210 175  17
Notes: a Includes squatter households who have either obtained title or responded
that they are in the process of trying to obtain a title.
b Includes 64 households paying rent to the property owner.
Table 2
Characteristics of the Communities
   Community               Established with an with   on Percent Percent
   No. Age      by Invasion Organizer        Resistence         Private Land Paid Bossa   Titled             
    1 42 yrs     -     -     -     -       0.0 %     95.0 %
    2 19         -     -     -     -     25.0     94.7
    3 18         -     -     -     -       0.0     95.0
    4 52     -     -     -     -     14.3     82.4
    5 47 yrs     Y     -     -     -       0.0 %    100.0 %
    6 47     Y     -     -     -     16.7     55.0
    7 21     Y     -     -     Y     20.0       0.0
    8 20     Y     -     Y     -       0.0     65.0
    9   7     Y     -     Y     Y       0.0     81.2
   10 32     Y     -     Y     Y     76.5     35.0
   11 27     Y     -     Y     Y     13.3     38.9
   12 20 yrs     Y     Y     -     -     43.8 %     30.0 %
   13 17     Y     Y     -     -     78.6     21.1
   14 18     Y     Y     -     -     65.0     35.0
   15 17     Y     Y     -     Y     26.7     50.0
   16 13     Y     Y     Y     -       6.2     63.2
   17 13     Y     Y     Y     -       6.2     55.0
   18 16     Y     Y     Y     Y       7.7     65.0
   19    4      Y     Y     Y     Y     11.1     40.0
   20 13      Y          Y          Y          Y          11.1        0.0
    Totals:      16      9      9      8     21.1 %     54.3 %
Note: a Percenatge of squatter households who paid a boss.             
Table 3
Household and Community Characteristics
Purchasers Squatters          Non-Owners    
Titled Untitled Titled Untitled
  Mean:
    Age of Community      25.9 yrs    23.4    14.8    33.2    25.9
      (10.8)  (12.0)    (7.3)   (14.8)   (12.2)
    Distance from City Center         5.7 km     5.2     7.7     3.5     5.4
       (3.1)    (2.0)    (3.0)    (2.4)    (2.5)
    Age of  Household Head      53.5 yrs    50.6    43.7    39.2    35.2
      (16.6)   (13.7)   (11.8)   (12.4)   (12.5)
    Per-capita Expenditure   $137.8    75.0    53.9   101.8    65.3
    (1996 U.S. dollars)    (113.5)   (84.2)   (32.1)   (92.3)   (48.9)
    Household Assets     $68.1    20.2      9.1     22.6      6.7
    (Non-Property, $100s)    (121.3)   (46.0)   (16.9)   (44.3)     (6.7)
    Lot Size     260.0 m2   146.7   137.1   183.1   173.0
     (505.0)   (72.5)   (68.8) (119.4)  (357.4)
    Years of Residence      16.4 yrs    17.6    10.5     7.3     6.9
         on Property     (10.6)  (10.7)    (6.7)    (8.2)    (7.1)
    Years Expect to      36.7  yrs    32.6    35.2    15.5    15.5
         Remain Resident     (15.0)   (15.7)   (16.4)   (18.2)   (17.4)
  Percent of Households with: b
    Education of Head      77.3  %     38.1    31.7    76.7    51.5
          > Primary     (42.9)    (48.8)  (46.7)   (42.6)   (50.8)
    Urban Origin of Head      90.9  %     96.5    86.6    87.7    78.8
      (29.4)    (18.6)  (34.2)   (33.1)   (41.5)
    Adult Males      86.4  %     92.9    89.4    89.0    81.8
    (35.1)    (25.8)  (30.8)   (31.5)   (39.2)
Notes:    a Standard deviations are in parentheses.
b Urban origin equals one if the household head came to the property from either
   of the two main cities, Guayaquil or Quito; zero otherwise.  Adult Males include males
   from 18 to 65, or older if designated the head of household.
Table 4
Contributions to the Security of Untitled Squatters
   Panel A: The Contribution of an Outside Organizer                                                   
   The Likelihood of Eviction All   In Community
   in the Next Year is:     Untitled Squatters  with an Organizer Without
      Sure or Very Possible       0.0 %         0.0 %     0.0 %
      Possible             3.5        3.5     3.0
      Not Very Probable     19.0      13.5       39.0
      Impossible     77.5               83.0              58.0 
  100.0 %    100.0 %   100.0 %
    Number of Respondents     142       111         31
   Panel B: Probit - Eviction is Impossible versus Other                                                           
     Variable Coefficient S.E.a     P-Value  dF/dX   S.E.      
     ln(age) -0.12 0.34   0.72 -0.03 0.08
     distance  0.17 0.06 <0.01  0.04 0.01
     percent paid boss  2.60 0.79 <0.01  0.62 0.18
       (community)
     formal enforcementb  0.24 0.33   0.46  0.06 0.09
     ownership document 0.64 0.31   0.04  0.17 0.09
     invasion resisted  0.26 0.41   0.54  0.06 0.10
     private land -0.69 0.39   0.08 -0.16 0.08
     paid boss (household) -0.57 0.36   0.11 -0.15 0.10
     ln(years resident)  0.46 0.19   0.01  0.11 0.04
     ln(assets)  0.23 0.12   0.05  0.05 0.03
     education > primary  0.31 0.32   0.33  0.07 0.07
     adult males -0.78 0.60   0.19 -0.13 0.06
   
     Number of observations        141
     Observed/predicted probability at the means  0.77 / 0.84
     Pseudo R2    24.6     
Notes: aS.E. are estimated standard errors. The marginal effects, dF/dX, are calculated
 as discrete changes in the case of dummy variables.
bFormal enforcement is a dummy variable which is one if the household responds
 that courts, judges or the municipality settle community disputes; zero otherwise.
Table 5
Probit - The Ability to Contract with Strangers ( Either Rent or Sell)
    Variable                    Coefficient S.E.a       P-Value  dF/dX     
ln(age)  1.10 0.40 <0.01   -
community organizer  1.18 0.77   0.12   -
formal enforcement  0.06 0.25   0.80  0.03
invasion resisted -0.28 0.27   0.29 -0.11
private land -0.08 0.22   0.73 -0.03
title  2.32 1.02   0.02   -
ownership document -0.15 0.27   0.58 -0.06
title*age -0.08 0.02 <0.01   -
title*organizer -0.82 0.50   0.10   -
organizer*age -0.11 0.05   0.02   -
govt titling prgmb -0.73 0.26 <0.01 -0.28
paid boss (household) -0.20 0.23   0.38 -0.08
ln(years resident) -0.10 0.13   0.45 -0.04
ln(assets)  0.18 0.07   0.02  0.07
education > primary  0.25 0.21   0.22  0.10
adult males -1.05 0.38 <0.01  0.39
title*adult males  0.20 0.86   0.81  0.08
    Number of observations  251
    Observed/ predicted probability at the means      0.42 / 0.43
    Pseudo R2  24.9
Notes: aS.E. are estimated standard errors.  The marginal effects are calculated as discrete changes
 for dummy variables.  For marginal effects for interacted variables see Table 6.
bGovernment titling program is a dummy variable which is one if the community respondant
  indicated that there had been a government program to encourage titling in the community
  in the past two years.
Table 6
Effects of Title, Organizers and Time on the Ability to Contract
  Predicted
     Probabilitya   Title     Organizer Community Age
    0.22 No No  8 yrs
    0.94 Yes No  8 yrs
     0.55 No No 18 yrs (mean)
    0.86 Yes No 18 yrs
    0.24 No Yes 18 yrs
    0.30 Yes Yes 18 yrs
Note: aCalculated using the estimates in the first column of Table 5.  Eight
 years is the mean age of 18 minus one standard deviation.  All other
 variables are at their means.
Table 7
Probit - The Ability to Contract with Strangers
Can Sell Property                                    Can Rent Whole House                      
    Variable                    Coefficient S.E. a       P-Value  Coefficientb S.E          P-Value  
ln(age)  0.52 0.38   0.17  0.38 0.46   0.41
community organizer  0.52 0.77    0.50 -0.45 1.07   0.68
formal enforcement -0.08 0.24   0.73  0.12 0.29   0.69
invasion resisted -0.08 0.27   0.77 -0.18 0.31   0.56
private land -0.11 0.23   0.63  0.40 0.28   0.15
title  1.12 0.81   0.17  ++   . <0.01
ownership document -0.07 0.29   0.81 -0.07 0.38   0.85
title*age   -0.05 0.02 <0.01 -0.07 0.02 <0.01
title*organizer -0.49 0.45   0.28 -1.47 0.54 <0.01
organizer*age -0.07 0.05   0.12  0.01 0.06   0.92
govt titling prgmc -0.31 0.26   0.23 -0.82 0.35    0.02
paid boss (household) -0.20 0.24   0.40 -0.26 0.30   0.38
ln(years resident) -0.06 0.14   0.68  0.04 0.19   0.82
ln(assets)  0.16 0.07   0.02  0.24 0.09 <0.01
education > primary  0.24 0.20   0.23 -0.05 0.25   0.83
adult males -1.19 0.39 <0.01  ++   . <0.01
title*adult males  0.79 0.68   0.25   --   . <0.01
Observed/ predicted probability at the means 0.33 / 0.31 0.22 / 0.14
Pseudo R2   0.20   0.37
Notes: aS.E. are estimated standard errors.
b The full set of coefficients on gender/title categorical variables are unestimable as no untitle household without males can rent.
    Therefore, entries only indicate signs of the effects.
cSee fn c of Table 5.
Table 8
Expected Impact of Title on Property Value a
     Variable                     Coefficient S.E.b   P-Value  
constant  1.75 0.58 <0.01
ln(age) -0.15 0.06     0.03
distance  0.04 0.01 <0.01
percent paid boss (community) -0.24 0.13   0.07
formal enforcement -0.30 0.07 <0.01
paid boss (household) -0.01 0.06   0.84
ln(years resident) -0.17 0.09   0.07
ln(assets) -0.04 0.04   0.28
education > primary -0.02 0.05   0.77
adult males -0.70 0.17 <0.01
males*ln(yrs resident)  0.24 0.08 <0.01
     Number of observations       51
     Adjusted R2 0.66
     Sample Mean Expected Change (s.d.) 23.5% (5.0)
    
Predicted Change in Value from Title Adult Males Years of Residence
45.9 %   No  5 yrs
28.1 %  No 14 yrs (mean)
15.5  Yes  5
22.9  Yes 14
Notes: aThe dependent variable is the difference (in logs) of the value that a household 
 believes it could obtain for its property with a title without a title.  Only households
  who indicate that they can sell in both states, at least to a relative, are included.  WLS 
 estimates allow for heteroscedasticity across communities.
bS.E. are estimated robust standard errors.
Table 9
The Expected Costs of Obtaining Title: Time and Money
Panel A:   Summary Statistics                                                                                                                                                         
Number of  Months                             Cost of Titling (1996 U.S. Dollars)    
Household Community Household Community
mean  20.6  4.8  $43.7  $28.9
standard deviation  32.7  2.9    53.1    26.5
25th percentile    2  3      3.4      1.4
median    6  4    28.6    11.4
75th percentile  24  6    57.1    42.9
number with zero    7  0     29      3  
mean w/o zeros  21.7  4.8     55.1    34.7
Panel B: Probit Results                                                                                                                                                                      
Number of  Months                             Ln Cost  (1996 U.S. Dollars)              
Variable                 Coefficient S.E.         P-Value  Coefficient S.E          P-Value  
distance  -0.26 0.80   0.74 -0.30 0.04 <0.01
invasion resisted  12.41 8.29   0.14 -0.61 0.30   0.04
private land -22.17 8.12 <0.01  0.97 0.32 <0.01
ownership document  -5.42 6.62   0.41 -0.11 0.20   0.56
government titling program -20.68 7.13 <0.01 -0.20 0.29  0.48
ln(lot size)  16.50  8.41   0.05  0.47 0.25   0.06
Number of observations    138    110
     Adjusted R2   0.16   0.39
Notes: aS.E. are estimated standard errors.
